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THE HEARSAY AND CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
PROBLEMS CAUSED BY ADMITTING WHAT A 
NON-TESTIFYING INTERPRETER SAID THE 
CRIMINAL DEFENDANT SAID  
 
Zachary C. Bolitho 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Over 24.4 million non-English speakers currently live in the United States.1 
That number is projected to rise.2 This reality presents unique challenges to many of 
our social institutions, including the criminal justice system.3 One of those challenges 
is described in the following, regularly occurring, scenario. 
A police officer arrests a suspected criminal. The officer wishes to interview 
the suspect but there is a problem. The officer speaks English. The suspect does not. 
The officer, therefore, recruits a bilingual individual (often another police officer) to 
serve as an interpreter during the interview. The interview then proceeds in four 
steps. First, the officer asks a question in English. Second, the interpreter conveys 
the question to the suspect in his native language. Third, the suspect answers the 
question in his native language. Fourth, the interpreter conveys the suspect’s answer 
to the officer in English. 
Fast forward six months. The suspect has been formally charged with a 
crime, and the case is proceeding to trial. For one reason or another, the prosecutor 
does not call the interpreter to testify at the defendant’s trial. The prosecutor does, 
 
 Assistant Professor, Campbell University School of Law, Raleigh, North Carolina, and former federal 
prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice. The author would like to thank Stefan Longo for his 
research assistance and William Woodruff and Daniel Tilly for their helpful comments on earlier drafts 
of this Article. 
 1. See ROSEANN DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF COURT INTERPRETATION, THEORY, 
POLICY, AND PRACTICE, XLVIII (2d ed. 2012) (“As of 2012, more than 24.4 million people in the United 
States . . . are unable to speak or understand English at the level required to knowingly or intelligently 
participate in court proceedings or to utilize court services.”); see also CHRISTINE P. GAMBINO ET 
AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ENGLISH-SPEAKING ABILITY OF THE FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES: 2012, at 2–3, https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2014/acs/acs-26.pdf 
(reporting that the foreign-born population in the U.S. increased from 14.1 million in 1980 to 40.8 million 
in 2012, with approximately half of those 40.8 million speaking English “less than ‘very well’”). 
 2. DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ, supra note 2, at 27 (stating that “U.S. Census data project a significant 
growth” in non-English speakers residing in the U.S.). 
 3. SUSAN SHAH ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERCOMING LANGUAGE BARRIERS: SOLUTIONS 
FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 4–5 (2007), https://storage.googleapis.com/vera-web-assets/downloads/ 
Publications/overcoming-language-barriers-solutions-for-lawenforcement/legacy_downloads/ 
Overcoming_Language_Barriers_FINAL.pdf (describing the obstacles presented to law enforcement 
officers by the increasing population of non-English speakers). 
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however, call the investigating officer as a witness. The prosecutor asks the officer 
to tell the jury what the defendant said during the interview. The officer lacks the 
ability tell the jury what words the defendant uttered during the interview because 
the defendant was speaking a foreign language. But, the officer does have the ability 
to tell the jury what the non-testifying interpreter said that the defendant said. 
At this point, the antennae of any trial lawyer should be raised. Do the 
hearsay rules allow an officer to testify about what an interpreter said the defendant 
said outside of court? Even if such testimony is admissible under the hearsay rules, 
would the defendant have a right to cross-examine the interpreter under the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment? Those important questions have 
been posed to state and federal courts nationwide, with varying results. 
Over the last several decades, most courts have held that neither the hearsay 
rules nor the Confrontation Clause prevent the introduction of what a non-testifying 
interpreter said the defendant said.4 But, that has not always been the majority 
position. The admissibility of this category of statements is an issue the courts have 
struggled with for over a century.5 The earlier courts (i.e., pre-1970s) often excluded 
 
 4. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:52 (4th ed. 
2014) (“Many courts approve testimony describing admissions by the defendant, where the testifying 
witness does not understand his language and relies instead on someone who translated into English what 
he said.”); see also State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 N.W.2d 695, 698–99 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (holding that 
neither the Confrontation Clause nor the hearsay rules prohibited the introduction of statements made by 
a non-testifying interpreter during a police interrogation). 
There are a small number of courts, however, that have held relatively recently that such testimony is 
inadmissible hearsay. See, e.g., State v. Garcia-Trujillo, 948 P.2d 390, 393 (Wash. Ct. App. 1997) (holding 
that the detective’s testimony about what the defendant said through an interpreter was inadmissible 
hearsay); see also People v. Villagomez, 730 N.E.2d 1173, 1182 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (“[U]nless the person 
who acts as the interpreter testifies as to the taking of the statement, the statement is inadmissible 
hearsay.”). And, two courts have recently excluded statements made through a non-testifying interpreter 
on Confrontation Clause grounds. United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1323 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding 
that the Confrontation Clause was violated by allowing an officer to testify about statements the defendant 
made through an interpreter when the interpreter was not subject to cross examination); Taylor v. State, 
130 A.3d 509, 512 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (holding that the Confrontation Clause provided a deaf 
defendant with the right to cross examine a sign language interpreter used by the police during the 
defendant’s interrogation). 
 5. Compare People v. Yute, 56 Cal. 119, 121 (1880) (explaining that the trial court should have 
excluded testimony by a court reporter regarding what the defendant said through an interpreter in another 
court proceeding because the “interpreter, or some other witness who heard and understood the language 
in which the statements of the defendant were made, should have been called to prove them”), with 
Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355, 355 (Mass. 1892) (finding that testimony of what the defendant 
said through an interpreter did not violate the hearsay rules because “[t]he fact that a conversation was 
had through an interpreter affects the weight, but not the competency of the evidence.”). 
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such statements on hearsay grounds.6 Over time, however, many courts have become 
more willing to admit statements made by a non-testifying interpreter.7 
The courts have primarily reached the conclusion that the hearsay rules 
permit these out-of-court statements through the use of two similar, but 
fundamentally different, theories: (1) the “language conduit theory”; and (2) the 
“agency theory.”8 Both theories find their genesis in Federal Rule of Evidence 
801(d)(2)’s declaration that party opponent statements are exempt from the rule 
against hearsay.9 
Under the language conduit theory, the interpreter is little more than a 
telephone line through which statements pass from one person (the defendant) to 
another (the testifying witness). Even though the witness is testifying as to what 
words came out of the interpreter’s mouth, as opposed to the defendant’s, the 
language conduit theory treats the defendant as the declarant for purposes of the 
hearsay analysis.10 Put another way, the language conduit theory pretends that the 
defendant spoke directly to the testifying witness in English. The statement, 
therefore, is treated as the defendant’s and is admitted as a party opponent statement 
under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).11 
 
 6. See Saavedra v. State, 297 S.W.3d 342, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Early on, many 
jurisdictions seemed to hold . . . that the statement of an out-of-court interpreter . . . ‘was manifestly 
hearsay.’”); see also Scotto v. Dilbert Bros., Inc., 263 A.D. 1016, 1016 (N.Y. App. Div. 1942) (holding 
that statements made to a police officer through an interpreter were “hearsay and inadmissible” because 
the interpreter was “not called to testify as to the correctness of his interpretation”); State v. Epstein, 55 
A. 204, 208 (R.I. 1903) (finding that testimony regarding what a witness said out of court by a non-
testifying interpreter was “clearly hearsay” because the testifying witness “only knew what was in fact 
said by him from what the interpreter told them that he had said”); Turner v. State, 232 S.W. 801, 802 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (reversing conviction on hearsay grounds where a police officer testified 
regarding statements the defendant made through a non-testifying interpreter); Case Note, Evidence—
Hearsay—Statements Through Interpreter, 29 YALE L.J. 455, 459 (1920) (“It is clear that words which a 
witness has understood only by the translation of another are hearsay. And the general rule is that the 
witness cannot therefore testify as to what was said.”) 
 7. See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 27:37 (7th ed. 2013) 
(reporting that the “prevailing view” in the courts today is that the hearsay rules should not result in the 
exclusion of statements made by a defendant through a non-testifying interpreter); see also People v. 
Gutierrez, 916 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. App. 1995) (“[A] growing majority of jurisdictions now allow[] 
admission of translated testimony in appropriate circumstances . . . .”). 
 8. See BARBARA E. BERGMAN ET AL., 2 WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 8:7 (15th ed. 2013) 
(discussing the two theories the courts have used to resolve the hearsay issue). A small number of courts 
have also admitted out of court statements made by a non-testifying interpreter based on the residual 
hearsay exception found in Rule 807 or a state equivalent. See, e.g., State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 
939, 941–42 (Or. Ct. App. 2012). 
 9. State courts have relied on the provisions of their evidentiary codes that largely mirror Rule 
801(d)(2). 
 10. See United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the “translations 
did not create double hearsay because [the interpreter] was merely a ‘language conduit’ and not a declarant 
under the hearsay rule”); see also Correa v. Superior Court, 40 P.3d 739, 746 (Cal. 2002) (stating that 
under the language conduit theory “the statement simply is considered to be the statement of the original 
declarant, and not of the translator, so that no additional level of hearsay is added by the translation”). 
 11. See United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the 
interpreter was merely a “language conduit” between the defendant and the witness and, therefore, the 
interpreted statements were “within the same exception to the hearsay rule as when a defendant and 
another are speaking the same language”); see also FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A) (declaring that a statement 
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The courts applying the agency theory have reached the same result by way 
of a different route. Under the agency theory, the interpreter is treated as an agent of 
the defendant who was authorized to make statements on the defendant’s behalf.12 A 
defendant is presumed to have selected the interpreter as his agent simply by 
communicating through the interpreter during a conversation.13 Courts have gone so 
far as to treat bilingual police officers or other government-selected interpreters as 
the defendant’s agent during interrogations.14 Once the interpreter is declared the 
defendant’s agent, the statements made by the interpreter are rendered admissible as 
non-hearsay statements of a party opponent’s agent.15 
When the government seeks to introduce an out-of-court statement against 
a criminal defendant, the hearsay hurdle is not the only one that must be cleared. The 
statement must also be admissible under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation 
Clause.16 Relatively few courts have addressed the Confrontation Clause issue 
presented by the introduction of statements made by a non-testifying interpreter since 
the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington.17 
Of those courts to consider the issue post-Crawford, there is a split of authority at 
both the state and federal level. In terms of federal courts, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits 
 
is “not hearsay” if “[t]he statement is offered against a party and . . . was made by the party in an individual 
or representative capacity”). 
 12. See State v. Robles, 458 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
 13. See id. at 822 (“Absent evidence to the contrary, a suspect’s choice to communicate through an 
interpreter signals that the interpreter is the suspect’s agent.”); see also 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 835 
(2014) (recognizing that there is a “presumption of agency” that may be rebutted by the defendant in 
certain circumstances). 
 14. See United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1983) (treating the interpreter of out of 
court statements as the defendant’s agent for hearsay purposes even though the interpreter was an 
employee of the U.S. Customs Service); see also United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 859–60 (11th 
Cir. 1985) (treating a federal law enforcement officer as the defendant’s agent where the officer interpreted 
for another officer during an interrogation); People v. Gutierrez, 916 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(treating a police informant who served as an interpreter between undercover police officer and defendant 
as the defendant’s agent); Casen B. Ross, Comment, Clogged Conduits: A Defendant’s Right to Confront 
His Translated Statements, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1931, 1949 (2014) (“Even when the government provides 
a translator or when the translator is an employee of the government, an agency relationship may still 
exist.”). 
 15. See, e.g., Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 831 (stating that an officer could testify as to statements made by 
the defendant to an interpreter because “the prevailing view is that the translator is normally to be viewed 
as an agent of the defendant; hence the translation is attributable to the defendant as his own admission 
and is properly characterizable as non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) or (D)”). FED. R. EVID. 
801(d)(2)(C) provides that a statement is “not hearsay” if it “is offered against an opposing party . . . and 
was made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subjection.” Similarly, FED. 
R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D) provides that a statement is “not hearsay” if “it is offered against an opposing 
party . . . and was made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship 
while it existed.” 
 16. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL, § 14.03[1] 
(9th ed. 2011) (providing an overview of the relationship between the hearsay rules and the Confrontation 
Clause). 
 17. 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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have held that a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to cross examine the 
interpreter,18 while the Eleventh Circuit has reached the opposite conclusion.19 
Although the courts have been grappling with the admissibility of 
statements made by a non-testifying interpreter for years, it is an area that has 
received relatively little scholarly attention. Such attention is needed for three 
reasons. First, the rising population of non-English speakers20 is likely to result in 
increased attempts to introduce statements made by non-testifying interpreters in 
criminal trials. 
Second, the hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues raised by the 
introduction of interpreted statements are complex. One federal appellate judge has 
described the Confrontation Clause issue as a “novel and difficult question of 
constitutional law in an area where the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is still 
evolving.”21 Given the existence of a circuit split, this is certainly an issue that may 
attract Supreme Court review.22 
Third, most courts are incorrectly answering both the hearsay and 
Confrontation Clause questions with little resistance (or even attention) from 
scholars. Underlying the incorrect decisions is a misunderstanding of the task that 
interpreters perform. This Article seeks to dispel the myth that language 
interpretation—especially crime scene and stationhouse interpretation—is a 
scientific exercise performed by experts who are the linguistic equivalent of 
calculators that convert measurements from metric to standard. The reality is that 
language interpretation is a difficult task that requires significant training, skill, and 
judgment.23 Interpreters are not merely language conduits or presumptive agents of 
the speaker; rather, they are separate hearsay declarants who are often making 
“testimonial”24 statements against a criminal defendant. 
 
 18. United States v. Ye, 808 F.3d 395, 401–02 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding no Confrontation Clause 
violation where investigators testified regarding statements the defendants made by a non-testifying 
interpreter); United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (same); United States v. 
Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2012) (same); Hernandez v. State, 662 S.E.2d 325, 330 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2008) (same); People v. Morel, 8 Misc. 3d 67, 71–72 (N.Y. App. Term 2005) (same); Cassidy v. 
State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 715–16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (same). 
 19. See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1330–31 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding a Confrontation 
Clause violation where an officer testified about what a non-testifying interpreter said that the defendant 
said during an interview, but affirming the defendant’s conviction because the violation did not amount 
to plain error); see also Tom S. Xu, Confrontation and the Law of Evidence: Can the Language Conduit 
Theory Survive in the Wake of Crawford?, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1516–17 (2014) (describing the circuit 
split created by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Charles). 
 20. See Susan Heavey, Use of Language other than English in the U.S. on the Rise: Census, REUTERS, 
(Aug. 6, 2013), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-language-census-idUSBRE97514V20130806 
(“The number of people in the United States who speak a language other than English at home has nearly 
tripled over the past three decades, far outpacing the overall population growth.”). 
 21. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1332 (Marcus, J., concurring in judgment). 
 22. See generally SUP. CT. R. 10(a) (stating that one of the considerations the Supreme Court 
considers when deciding whether to grant certiorari is whether “a United States court of appeals has 
entered a decision in conflict with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
important matter”). 
 23. See DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ, supra note 2, at 19–25 (explaining the complexity of language 
interpretation and discussing the skills required of a reliable interpreter). 
 24. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50, 65 (2012) (alterations in original) (explaining that 
under the Confrontation Clause “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial [can be] admitted 
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This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an in-depth discussion 
of the hearsay problem raised by admitting statements made by a non-testifying 
interpreter. It explores the historical treatment of the problem and discusses the 
development of the agency and language conduit theories. Additionally, Part I 
highlights the flaws with both theories—the language conduit theory is based on a 
false premise regarding the task of interpreting, and the agency theory contradicts 
well settled principles of agency law. 
Part II discusses the Confrontation Clause issue by describing the current 
state of the law and arguing that the Sixth Amendment is violated when the 
government admits statements that a non-testifying interpreter made to a police 
officer outside of court. Specifically, when an interpreter tells a police officer what 
the defendant said, the interpreter has made a “testimonial” statement under 
Crawford and its progeny—particularly Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts25 and 
Bullcoming v. New Mexico.26 Part III provides practical advice on how prosecutors 
and police officers can obtain and admit such statements without violating the 
hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause. A brief conclusion follows in Part IV. 
I. THE RULE AGAINST HEARSAY AND THE ADMISSION OF  
STATEMENTS MADE BY A NON-TESTIFYING INTERPRETER 
A majority of the federal and state courts to address the issue in recent years 
have held that the rule against hearsay does not prevent a witness from testifying 
about what a non-testifying interpreter said that the defendant said outside of court.27 
Some courts have reached that conclusion by relying on the language conduit theory, 
and others have relied on the agency theory.28 Both theories are explained and 
critiqued below. But, first an overview of basic hearsay principles and a discussion 
of the historical treatment of this particular hearsay issue is necessary. 
A. Overview of relevant hearsay principles 
The Federal Rules of Evidence define hearsay as “a statement that: (1) the 
declarant does not make while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party 
offers in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”29 A “declarant” is the 
 
only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-
examine”). 
 25. 557 U.S. 305 (2009). 
 26. 564 U.S. 647 (2011). 
 27. See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 4 (“Many courts approve testimony describing 
admissions by the defendant, where the testifying witness does not understand [the defendant’s] language 
and relies instead on someone who translated into English what he said.”); see also FISHMAN & 
MCKENNA, supra note 8 (explaining that the “prevailing view” in the courts is that statements made by a 
non-testifying interpreter are not barred by the rule against hearsay). 
 28. See BERGMAN ET AL., supra note 8, § 8:7. A small number of state courts have relied on the 
residual or “catch all” hearsay exception. See, e.g., State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 939, 939 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2012). 
 29. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Most state courts have adopted the identical or a substantially similar 
definition of hearsay. See DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE 25 (2015) 
(“The Federal Rules have also influenced many state courts and legislatures. The rules apply only to 
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“person who makes the out-of-court statement that is reported or otherwise 
introduced at trial through a witness or a document.”30 Hearsay statements are 
inadmissible,31 unless they fall within an exemption found in Rule 801(d)32 or an 
exception found in Rules 803, 804, or 807.33 
There are two categories of exemptions found in Rule 801(d)(2)—prior 
statements of a witness and party opponent statements.34 The party opponent 
exemption is the relevant exemption here. It is a broad exemption—encompassing 
all statements made by a party and offered by an adverse party.35 There are five ways 
that a statement can qualify as a party opponent statement: (A) statements made by 
the party opponent in an individual or representative capacity; (B) statements of 
another that have been adopted by the party opponent; (C) statements made by a 
person who was authorized to speak on behalf of the party opponent; (D) statements 
made by an agent or employee of the party opponent; and (E) statements made by a 
defendant’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.36 If a 
statement falls within one of the five categories, it is, by definition, not hearsay. 
Many statements are admitted under Rule 801(d)(2). In fact, it is one of the most 
common reasons why out-of-court statements are admitted during trials.37 
The hearsay waters are hard enough to navigate when only one statement is 
involved. The waters become even more treacherous when a party seeks to introduce 
an out-of-court statement that has another out-of- court statement imbedded within 
it. For example, a police officer seeks to testify as follows in a robbery trial: “During 
my investigation, the bank teller told me [hearsay statement #1] that shortly before 
the robbery the defendant entered the bank and said [hearsay statement #2] ‘I will 
back in a few minutes to make a big withdrawal.’” This example presents what is 
commonly referred to as “multiple hearsay,” “double hearsay,” or “hearsay-within-
hearsay.”38 
There is a specific evidence rule, Rule 805, that applies when a party seeks 
to introduce hearsay-within-hearsay. Rule 805 mandates that “each part of the 
 
federal courts, but more than forty states have adopted state codes that are very similar to the Federal 
Rules.”). 
 30. GLEN WEISSENBERGER & JAMES J. DUANE, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: RULES, LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, COMMENTARY AND AUTHORITY § 801.4 (7th ed. 2011). 
 31. FED. R. EVID. 802. 
 32. The provisions found in Rule 801(d) are referred to as “exemptions” or “exclusions” because 
statements that fall within them are, by operation of the rules, non-hearsay even though they satisfy the 
definition set forth in Rule 801(c). See G. MICHAEL FENNER, THE HEARSAY RULE 40 (3d ed. 2013) (“It 
is important to understand that 801(d) does not create exceptions to the hearsay rule; rather, it excludes 
certain statements from the rule itself . . . . The definition in [Rule 801(d)] very clearly states that they are 
not hearsay.”); see also MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 29, at 463 (stating that “[t]o honor [Rule 
801(d)’s] identification of these statements as ‘not hearsay,’ we will call them exemptions rather than 
exceptions”). 
 33. FED. R. EVID. 803, 804, 807. 
 34. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1), (2). 
 35. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:44 (4TH ED. 
2014 & SUPP. 2018). 
 36. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(A)–(E). 
 37. MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 29, at 635. 
 38. WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 30, § 805.1. 
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combined statements conform[] with an exception to the rule” against hearsay.39 In 
other words, the proponent must separate out the individual hearsay statements and 
identify a Rule 801(d) exemption or a Rule 803, 804, or 807 exception that applies 
to each statement. If an exception or exemption cannot be found for each level of 
hearsay, then the statement will be excluded as inadmissible hearsay.40 
Keeping that in mind, consider the situation where a witness testifies as to 
what a non-testifying interpreter told him that the defendant said during an interview. 
At first blush, this appears to be a classic Rule 805 hearsay-within-hearsay issue 
involving two out-of-court statements by two separate declarants: (1) the defendant’s 
statement to the interpreter in the defendant’s native tongue; and (2) the interpreter’s 
statement to the witness in English. In the first statement, the hearsay declarant would 
be the defendant. In the second statement, the hearsay declarant would be the 
interpreter. Under Rule 805 the witness’s testimony as to what the interpreter said 
the defendant said would be inadmissible unless each statement fell within a Rule 
801(d) exemption or a Rule 803, 804, or 807 exception. 
The statement from the defendant to the interpreter would be admissible as 
a party opponent statement under Rule 801(d)(2)(A).41 The much more difficult 
question concerns the admissibility of the statement from the interpreter to the 
witness. The courts have responded to that question by developing the language 
conduit theory and the agency theory. Although different, both theories have the 
effect of rendering the Rule 805 hearsay-within-hearsay analysis unnecessary when 
a witness testifies as to what a non-testifying interpreter said that the defendant said.42 
Most courts to consider the issue in recent years have used one or both 
theories to permit a witness to testify about what a non-testifying interpreter said that 
the defendant said. In the past, however, many courts viewed such testimony as 
inadmissible hearsay.43 Since an appreciation of history is necessary to understand 
the present, the next section examines the historical treatment of this issue. That 
 
 39. FED. R. EVID. 805. Rule 805 only specifically mentions “exceptions,” but it “should be read to 
also reach statements that qualify as ‘not-hearsay’ under Rule 801(d).” MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra 
note 4, § 8.79. 
 40. See FENNER, supra note 32, at 382 (“When testimonial or documentary evidence is built upon 
multiple layers of hearsay, then, before the evidence will be admissible, there must be an exception for 
each layer.”). 
 41. E.g., United States v. Roe, 670 F.2d 956, 963 (11th Cir. 1982) (“A defendant’s own statements 
are admissible against him as party admissions under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A).”); see also ROY R. RAY, 
TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 789 (3d ed. 1980) (“If a declarant makes a statement 
in a foreign tongue and A translates this statement to B who does not understand the language in which it 
was originally spoken, the original declaration may be admissible if proper proof of it is made, as an 
admission of a party.”). 
 42. See, e.g., United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1983) (explaining that the 
“translator is normally to be viewed as an agent of the defendant; hence is translation his attributable to 
the defendant as his own admission and is properly characterized as non-hearsay under Rule 801(d)(2)(C) 
or (D)”); see also United States v. Shibin, 722 F.3d 233, 248 (4th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he absence in court of 
the interpreter did not render the statements inadmissible as hearsay because the interpreter was not the 
declarant, but only a ‘language conduit.’”). 
 43. See generally Case Note, supra note 6, at 459 (“[W]ords which a witness has understood only by 
the translation of another are hearsay. And the general rule is that the witness cannot therefore testify as 
to what was said.”). 
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section is followed by a thorough discussion and critique of the language conduit and 
agency theories. 
B. Historical perspective 
President Harry Truman once said, “there is nothing new in the world 
except the history you do not know.”44 That is undoubtedly true with respect to the 
issue of whether a witness can testify about statements made by a non-testifying 
interpreter. Due to the large number of non-English speakers now residing in the 
United States,45 the issue has been raised regularly in recent years. Despite its recent 
prevalence, this issue is not new. It has been confronting courts for over a century.46 
The majority approach today, however, stands in stark contrast to the approach that 
once prevailed. 
Today, most courts allow a witness to testify as to what a non-testifying 
interpreter said the defendant said.47 Historically, the “general rule” was that “words 
which a witness has understood only by the translation of another are hearsay.”48 The 
following sections chronicle the shift from a general rule of exclusion to a general 
rule of admission. 
1. The Late 1870s to the 1960s 
Concomitant with the rise in United States immigration in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries,49 courts were confronted with the issue of admitting statements 
made by a non-testifying interpreter.50 What emerged from the courts was a 
consensus—although not complete agreement—that admitting such statements 
violated the rule against hearsay.51 As reported in a 1920 edition of the Yale Law 
 
 44. Truman Quotes, TRUMAN ST. U., http://www.truman.edu/about/history/our-namesake/truman-
quotes/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2019). 
 45. See Heavey, supra note 20. 
 46. See, e.g., Territory v. Big Knot on Head, 11 P. 670, 670–71 (Mont. 1886) (holding that testimony 
of a witness regarding what a non-testifying interpreter said the defendant said during an interview was 
“manifestly hearsay” and inadmissible). 
 47. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 7, § 27:37. 
 48. Case Note, supra note 6, at 459; see also People v. Gutierrez, 916 P.2d 598, 600 (Colo. 1995) 
(recognizing that older cases treated statements made by a non-testifying interpreter as hearsay, but 
explaining that “a growing majority of jurisdictions now allows admission of translated testimony in 
appropriate circumstances assuring its reliability, on the theory that the interpreter serves as an agent of, 
or a language conduit for, the declarant”). 
 49. See generally History.com Editors, U.S. Immigration Before 1965, HIST., 
http://www.history.com/topics/u-s-immigration-before-1965 (last visited Oct. 29, 2009) (explaining that 
the United States experienced a “major wave[] of immigration . . . from the 1880s to 1920”). 
 50. See, e.g., People v. Lee Fat, 54 Cal. 527, 530–31 (1880); see also Kalos v. United States, 9 F.2d 
268, 271 (8th Cir. 1925); People v. John, 69 P. 1063, 1064 (Cal. 1902); State v. Noyes, 36 Conn. 80, 80–
82 (1869); Hawaii v. Kawano, 20 Haw. 469, 474–76 (1911); People v. Chin Sing, 242 N.Y. 419, 420–21 
(1926); State v. Epstein, 55 A. 204, 208 (R.I. 1903); Turner v. State, 232 S.W. 801, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1921). 
 51. See, e.g., Fat, 54 Cal. at 531 (finding that trial court erred by admitting a court reporter’s notes 
of what a defendant said through an interpreter during a preliminary examination where the interpreter 
did not testify at trial); Sing, 242 N.Y. at 422 (concluding that testimony as to what the defendants said 
through a non-testifying interpreter “was hearsay and inadmissible”); Turner, 232 S.W. at 802 (reversing 
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Journal: “It is clear that words which a witness has understood only by the translation 
of another are hearsay. And the general rule is that the witness cannot therefore 
testify as to what was said.”52 
The Supreme Court of the Territory of Montana’s 1886 decision in 
Territory of Montana v. Big Knot on Head is a good example of how the early courts 
resolved the issue.53 In Big Knot on Head, the defendants were members of the 
Piegan tribe who were charged with stealing horses.54 The defendants did not speak 
English, and they were interviewed by an interpreter who worked for the 
government.55 At trial, prosecution witnesses testified that the interpreter told them 
that the defendants confessed to the crime.56 Reversing the convictions, the appellate 
court ruled that the testimony as to what the defendants told the interpreter “was 
manifestly hearsay.”57 The Big Knot on Head court explained that out-of-court 
statements made to an interpreter “stood in the same relation as those made to any 
other person.”58 
Other early courts spoke just as unequivocally on the issue.59 Consider the 
Court of Appeals of New York’s decision in People v. Sing.60 There, a Chinese 
defendant was accused of murder.61 The police interrogated him with the assistance 
of two Chinese interpreters chosen by the police.62 Neither of the interpreters testified 
at trial. Instead, the prosecution presented “third parties” who testified regarding 
 
conviction on hearsay grounds where the trial court permitted an investigator to testify regarding 
statements the defendant made through a non-testifying interpreter). 
 52. Case Note, supra note 6, at 459; see also Evidence—Hearsay—Report of Testimony Given 
Through an Interpreter, 15 HARV. L. REV. 859, 859 (1902) (explaining that when a third party seeks to 
testify as to what another individual said outside of court through an interpreter “it is hard to meet the 
objection of hearsay”). 
 53. 11 P. 670 (Mont. 1886). 
 54. Id. at 670. 
 55. Id. at 670–71. 
 56. Id. at 670. 
 57. Id. at 671. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See, e.g., Indian Fred v. State, 282 P. 930, 933 (Ariz. 1929) (opining that testimony from a deputy 
sheriff about what the defendants said through an interpreter was “clearly hearsay,” but finding the error 
was harmless because the same information was also introduced by the interpreter who “testified in person 
as to the statements made by defendants”); People v. Ah Yute, 56 Cal. 119, 121 (1880) (finding that the 
trial court erred by allowing a court reporter to testify about what the defendant said through an interpreter 
at a prior court hearing because the reporter “did not pretend to testify from his own knowledge or 
recollection of what the witness said, but from the shorthand notes of what the interpreter had said. The 
interpreter, or some other witness who heard and understood the language in which the statements were 
made, should have been called to prove them”); State v. Epstein, 55 A. 204, 208 (R.I. 1903) (holding that 
the trial court erred by admitting testimony from police officers regarding what the defendant said through 
an interpreter because “it was clearly hearsay testimony; for [the officers] only knew what was in fact said 
by [the defendant] from what the interpreter told them that he said”); Turner v. State, 232 S.W. 801, 802 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1921) (reversing the defendant’s robbery conviction because the trial court admitted the 
sheriff’s testimony about what the defendant told him through an interpreter, which the court held was 
“hearsay and inadmissible”). 
 60. 152 N.E. 248, 248 (1926). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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what the interpreters said that the defendant said during the interrogation.63 The 
defendant was convicted of murder, and he appealed.64 The Sing court reversed, 
remarking that the testimony “was so clearly [hearsay] as not to permit any serious 
discussion of the question.”65 In reaching that conclusion, the court highlighted that 
the interpreters were not the defendant’s agent because the defendant “had nothing 
to do with” their selection.66 
The same approach largely prevailed in the mid-Twentieth century, as 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court of Nebraska’s 1955 decision in Garcia v. 
State.67 There, the defendant was convicted of murder. At trial, the government 
called the county sheriff to testify about his interview of the defendant.68 Because 
the defendant did not speak English, the sheriff used an interpreter to assist with the 
questioning.69 The defendant lodged a hearsay objection to the sheriff’s testimony 
about what the interpreter said the defendant said.70 
The trial court initially allowed the sheriff’s testimony, but later sustained 
the defendant’s objection and prevented the sheriff from testifying as to what the 
interpreter said the defendant said.71 The Garcia court found that the trial court erred 
by initially allowing the testimony because “the correct rule is that the testimony of 
a witness as to a statement made by another person is hearsay when he understood 
it, not as originally given, but as translated by an interpreter not then under oath.”72 
The court, however, refused to reverse the defendant’s conviction because the error 
was harmless.73 
During the 1800s and early 1900s, the federal courts confronted the issue 
less frequently than their state counterparts. The most thorough federal court opinion 
discussing the issue is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s decision in 
Kalos v. United States.74 In Kalos, the defendant was charged with receiving and 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id.; see also People v. Ong Git, 137 P. 283, 286 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1913) (holding that trial court 
correctly excluded evidence from a coroner’s inquest that was conducted using an interpreter who did not 
testify at trial because admitting the evidence “would have been a transgression of the rule of evidence 
which excludes hearsay testimony.”); Boyd v. State, 180 S.W. 230, 232–33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1915) 
(stating that testimony by police officers regarding what a victim said through an interpreter was “purely 
hearsay. [The officers] knew nothing that occurred, except the conversation in the Spanish language, 
which [the interpreter] interpreted to them”). 
 66. Sing, 152 N.E. at 248. 
 67. 68 N.W.2d 151 (Neb. 1955); see also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ganz, 119 So. 2d 319, 
321 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960) (“Plaintiff’s testimony as to what an interpreter told him someone else said 
was incompetent as hearsay and should have been excluded.”). 
 68. Garcia, 68 N.W.2d at 156, 158–59. 
 69. Id. at 159. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.; see also Gallegos v. People, 403 P.2d 864, 868 (Colo. 1965) (en banc) (“The general rule in 
criminal and civil cases is that a witness may not testify to another’s statements made in conversation 
through an interpreter, because such testimony, being based upon interpretation rather than personal 
knowledge, is hearsay.”). 
 73. Garcia, 68 N.W.2d at 159. 
 74. 9 F.2d 268 (8th Cir. 1925). 
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concealing unlawfully imported morphine.75 A critical piece of evidence was the 
testimony of the postmaster from whom the defendant retrieved the morphine-filled 
package.76 The defendant was Greek and did not speak English.77 He conversed with 
the postmaster through a man named Leventis who was also present at the post 
office.78 
At trial, the prosecution called the postmaster as a witness.79 He relayed to 
the jury what Leventis told him the defendant had said.80 The defendant was 
convicted, and he argued on appeal that the trial court erroneously admitted the 
postmaster’s testimony.81 The Eighth Circuit agreed, explaining that the defendant 
“did not take Leventis to the postmaster to act for him as his agent . . . , and the 
statements made there in the English language by Leventis were not admissible.”82 
Not only did most courts of the era generally treat statements made by a 
non-testifying interpreter as hearsay, legal commentators did as well. As the 
foremost Evidence scholar, John Henry Wigmore, explained in his 1923 treatise: 
A person conversing with a third person through an interpreter is not 
qualified to testify to the other person’s statement because he knows them only 
through the hearsay of the interpreter. Ordinarily, therefore, the third person’s words 
cannot be proved by any one except the interpreter himself.83 
At that time, most courts and commentators simply treated out-of-court 
statements made by an interpreter the same as any other out-of-court statements—
they were inadmissible if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, unless an 
exception applied.84 
 
 75. Id. at 269. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 271. 
 81. Id. at 269, 271. 
 82. Id. at 271 (citing State v. Terline, 51 A. 204 (R.I. 1902)). It is worth noting that the military courts 
of the era reached the same conclusion under the Manual for Courts Martial. See United States v. 
Kauffman, 14 C.M.A..283, 294–297 (1963). In Kauffman, the defendant was an Air Force captain who 
had been convicted of conspiring with the enemy. Id. at 286. As part of the investigation, he was 
questioned by foreign police officers through an interpreter. Id. at 69–70. One of the foreign officers 
testified at the defendant’s court martial, and he introduced statements that the defendant made through 
the interpreter. Id. at 74. The defendant was convicted, and on appeal he argued, inter alia, that the trial 
court erred by admitting the statements. Id. The Kaufmann court held that the statements were “hearsay 
testimony [and] should not have been admitted over appellant’s objection.” Id. at 77. In support of its 
conclusion, the court explained that under the Manual for Courts-Martial the general rule is that “a 
statement made through an interpreter may be proved only by the testimony of the interpreter or by other 
evidence of the statement itself and may not be proved by evidence of the interpreter’s translation.” Id. at 
74. Although an exception existed for cases where the defendant made the interpreter his agent, the court 
found no agency relationship existed here. Id. at 77. 
 83. 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN 
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 812(3) (2d ed. 1923); see also 1 RONALD A. ANDERSON, WHARTON’S 
CRIMINAL EVIDENCE §254 (12th ed. 1955) (stating a “witness cannot testify to the extrajudicial statements 
of another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but translated for him by an interpreter, 
as such repetition by the witness of the interpreter’s statement of what the other person said is hearsay”). 
 84. See, e.g., People v. John, 69 P. 1063 (Cal. 1902), overruled by Correa v. Superior Court, 40 P.3d 
739 (Cal. 2002). The court in John provided the following analogy in support of its conclusion that 
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The early courts did recognize an exception in cases where the interpreter 
was acting as the agent of a party opponent.85 It was a limited exception that applied 
where a non-English speaking party selected the interpreter for the purpose of 
facilitating a conversation with an English speaker.86 As one commentator explained 
in 1912: 
When a person selects an interpreter to communicate with another person 
and to receive the answers such interpreter is the accredited agent of the one 
employing him and the statements of the interpreter in the course of the employment 
are admissible as original evidence and are in no sense hearsay.87 
Put another way, absent proof that the party expressly formed a principal-
agent relationship with the interpreter, out-of-court statements made by a non-
testifying interpreter were treated as inadmissible hearsay.88 The early courts did not 
 
introducing statements made to an interpreter through a third-party witness who overheard the 
conversation was hearsay: 
A person charged with crime makes a confession to one John Doe; Doe meets Richard 
Roe and relates to him what defendant had told him. At the trial John Doe is called as 
a witness, and testifies that he had truly narrated to Richard Roe what the defendant 
said. Then it is sought to have Richard Roe state what John Doe had said, instead of 
asking John Doe such questions. We may suppose John Doe has a poor memory, and 
has forgotten the particulars of the confession, but will swear positively that he made a 
true statement to Richard Roe, who does remember. 
Id. at 1064. The John court stated that allowing Roe to testify as to the statement would be to “make a 
new rule of evidence.” Id. And, the court saw no reason that the result should be any different simply 
because an interpreter was involved. Id.; see also Beth Gottesman Lindie, Comment, Inadequate 
Interpreting Services in Courts and the Rules of Admissibility of Testimony on Extrajudicial 
Interpretations, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 399, 420 (1993) (“Traditionally, courts have found that testimony 
of a witness regarding an out-of-court statement made by another person through an interpreter was 
inadmissible as hearsay because the witness understood the statement not as originally given but only as 
translated by an interpreter not then under oath. The courts believed this testimony was inadmissible 
because the witness, who only understood the statement as translated, was not testifying from personal 
knowledge.”). 
 85. See, e.g., State v. Terline, 51 A. 204, 208 (R.I. 1902) (“[T]he only exception which we find to the 
rule as thus stated is that, in those cases where the interpreter acts as the agent of the witness in translating 
his testimony, it is held that what the interpreter said is admissible on the ground that the language of the 
interpreter in such a case is to be taken prima facie, at any rate, as the language of the witness who employs 
him and speaks through him.”). 
 86. Case Note, supra note 6, at 459 (1920) (“[T]here is one main exception to the above rules . . . if 
a party selects an interpreter for his communication, that interpreter is his agent and the interpreter’s words 
are to be regarded prima facie as his own.”); see also People v. Chin Sing, 242 N.Y. 419, 422 (1926) ( 
“[O]nly cases . . . to sustain the admission of such evidence are cases where the interpreter had been 
selected by common consent of the parties . . . or by the party against whom the statements of the 
interpreter were offered . . . .”). 
 87. People v. Randazzio, 87 N.E. 112, 116 (N.Y. 1909) (quoting JONES ON EVIDENCE § 265 (2d ed. 
1912)). 
 88. See Kalos v. United States, 9 F.2d 268, 271 (8th Cir. 1925) (pointing out the lack of evidence 
showing that the defendant selected the interpreter “to act for him as his agent in [the] conversation”); 
Schearer v. Harber, 36 Ind. 536, 541 (1871) (finding that the interpreter was not the party’s agent because 
there was no evidence that the interpreter “was appointed at his instance, or even with his consent”); 
People v. Chin Sing, 242 N.Y. 419, 422–23 (1926) (explaining that determination of whether interpreter 
is the party’s agent should be determined by “the ordinary rules of principal and agent”); Gulf, Colo. & 
Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Giun, 116 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1938). 
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adopt a presumption of agency nor were they generally willing to view a 
government-provided interpreter as the defendant’s agent.89 
There were, however, a few courts that treated the narrow agency exception 
more like a gaping hole—one that swallowed the general rule prohibiting the 
admission of statements made by a non-testifying interpreter. Take for example the 
Court of Appeals of New York’s 1909 decision in People v. Randazzio.90 The 
defendant, an Italian speaker, was charged with murder.91 During the investigation, 
the defendant was interviewed through an interpreter who had been procured by the 
district attorney.92 The interview was transcribed by a stenographer.93 The interpreter 
did not testify, but the trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce the interview 
transcript.94 On appeal, the defendant argued that the interview transcript was 
inadmissible hearsay because it contained what the interpreter told the district 
attorney that the defendant said.95 
The Randazzio court rejected the hearsay argument on the basis that the 
interpreter was the defendant’s agent and, therefore, the statements were admissible 
as non-hearsay statements of a party opponent.96 In reaching that conclusion, the 
court attached little significance to the fact that the district attorney selected the 
interpreter.97 According to the Randazzio court, the interpreter was effectively a dual 
agent serving both the district attorney and the defendant.98 The defendant’s lack of 
agreement to have the interpreter serve as his agent was immaterial because “a person 
who is unable to speak or understand our language is compelled by necessity to 
communicate his ideas through the means of an interpreter and it matters not whether 
the interpreter is selected by him or some other person in order to make his statement 
original evidence.”99 In other words, the defendant had to speak through an 
 
 89. See Chin Sing, 242 N.Y. at 422 (finding testimony to be inadmissible hearsay and pointing out 
that the “[d]efendant had nothing to do with the selection” of the two men who served as interpreters for 
the police and case was, therefore, unlike those “where the interpreter had been selected by common 
consent of the parties . . . or by the party against whom the statements were offered in evidence”); see also 
United States v. Kauffman, 14 C.M.A. 283, 295, 297 (1963) (holding that an East German Special Agent 
who served as an interpreter during an interrogation was not the defendant’s agent because “there [was] 
nothing in the record to indicate that [the defendant] ever stated, was asked, or specifically consented to 
the use of [the Special Agent], as interpreter,” and the “respective relations of [the defendant] and [the 
officer] to the interpreter were vastly different. [The officer] produced the interpreter in connection with 
his conquest of [the defendant] and brought her to the meeting.\”); Terline, 51 A. at 208 (explaining that 
the interpreter “was the official interpreter in the district court, and that he was not the defendant’s agent. 
His interpretation of the defendant’s testimony, therefore, was improperly admitted . . . .”). 
 90. 194 N.Y. 147 (1909). 
 91. Id. at 149. 
 92. Id. at 154. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 156–57. 
 96. Id. at 156. 
 97. Id. at 157. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id.; see also Grocz v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 174 A.D. 505, 506 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916) (relying 
on Randazzio for the proposition that an interpreter can be treated as an agent of a party opponent even if 
there is no “express agency through personal selection of the interpreter or an authority implied from near 
relationship to the one being interpreted”). 
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interpreter and, therefore, any person who interpreted the defendant’s words 
automatically became his agent in the eyes of the Randazzio court. 
The Randazzio court rested its decision in part on the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts’ 1901 decision in Commonwealth v. Storti.100 Storti itself 
contains little analysis of the hearsay issue; rather, it relies on that court’s 1892 one-
page decision in Commonwealth v. Vose.101 Throughout the years, other courts have 
also pointed to Vose as authority for the agency approach to resolving the hearsay 
question raised by admitting statements made by a non-testifying interpreter.102 In 
Vose, the defendant was convicted of providing an unlawful abortion for a woman 
who later died.103 The defendant spoke English, and the woman spoke French.104 The 
defendant’s wife interpreted for them, and the conversation was overheard by a third-
party.105 At trial, the third-party testified—over the defendant’s objection—as to 
what the interpreter said that the defendant said.106 The defendant was convicted, and 
he appealed on the basis that the trial court incorrectly admitted the statements. 
The Vose court rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded that the 
statements were admissible because the interpreter was the defendant’s agent.107 In 
support of its decision, the court declared that “[w]hen two persons who speak 
different languages, and who cannot understand each other, converse through an 
interpreter, they adopt a mode of communication in which they assume that the 
interpreter is trustworthy, and which makes his language presumptively their 
own.”108 The court further explained that if “nothing appears to show that their 
respective relations to the interpreter differ, they may be said to constitute him their 
joint agent.”109 According to Vose, the interpretation provided by an interpreter “is 
prima facie deemed to be correct,” and the fact that the statements were made 
through an interpreter “affects the weight, but not the competency, of the 
evidence.”110 
Although the Vose court appeared to limit its holding to cases where neither 
party had a superior relationship with the interpreter, a small minority of 19th and 
early 20th century courts—such as Randazzio—failed “to recognize and give effect 
to this qualification . . . result[ing] in certain cases reaching conclusions which, while 
declared to be supported on the ground that an agency existed, are not, in fact so 
supported and the evidence, while admitted, was none the less hearsay.”111 Over 
 
 100. 58 N.E. 1021 (Mass. 1901). 
 101. Id. at 1023 (citing Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1892)). 
 102. See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 198 F. 596, 601–03 (7th Cir. 1912) (relying on Vose and adopting 
its reasoning); Meacham v. State, 33 So. 983–84 (Fla. 1903) (same); Oullette v. Ledoux, 30 A.2d 13, 15 
(N.H. 1943) (same); see also George E. Fee, Editorial Note, An Interpreter’s Statement as Affected by the 
Hearsay Rule, 1 U. CIN. L. REV. 73, 90 (1927) (identifying Vose as the “leading case in support” of the 
agency exception). 
 103. Commonwealth v. Vose, 32 N.E. 355 (Mass. 1892). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Fee, supra note 103, at 91. 
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time, however, the minority approach has become the majority approach with most 
courts now applying the agency exception and its cousin, the language conduit 
approach, to broadly permit the introduction of statements made by a non-testifying 
interpreter.112 The next section discusses this evolution. 
2. The 1970s to Present 
Although the cause of the shift from exclusion to admission is difficult to 
determine, it is clear that the shift began in the 1970s, intensified in the 1980s and 
1990s, and has continued to the present day. Much of the change was generated by 
a series of federal appellate court decisions, beginning with the Ninth Circuit’s 1973 
opinion in United States v. Ushakow.113 Although Ushakow is a short per curiam 
opinion, it served as the primary catalyst for the “language conduit” approach that 
many courts have since used to resolve the hearsay question. 
In Ushakow, the defendant was convicted of possessing marijuana with the 
intent to distribute.114 The government introduced the contents of a conversation the 
defendant and a Spanish-speaking coconspirator had through an interpreter.115 The 
Ninth Circuit affirmed and cursorily resolved the hearsay issue by stating that the 
interpreter “was merely a language conduit” between the defendant and the Spanish-
speaker.116 Thus, the “testimony is within the same exception to the hearsay rule as 
when a defendant and another are speaking the same language.”117 The Ushakow 
court’s conclusion is unsupported by citation to authority and its opinion devoid of 
analysis. Nonetheless, it has been continually relied upon as support for the 
proposition that an interpreter is merely a language conduit and, therefore, not a 
declarant for hearsay purposes.118 
 
 112. See, e.g., Cruz-Reyes v. State, 74 P.3d 219, 223 (Alaska Ct. App. 2003) (“The federal and state 
courts that have addressed this issue in recent years have generally held that an interpreter does not add 
another layer of hearsay—either under the theory that the interpreter acted as an agent of the declarant, or 
under the theory that the interpreter merely acted as a language conduit between the participants in the 
conversation (or some combination of the two theories).”). 
 113. 474 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); see also Saavedra v. State, 297 S.W.3d 342, 347 n.25 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (recognizing that the “phrase ‘language conduit’ seems to have first appeared” in 
Ushakow); Daniel Benoit, Note, Constitutional Law/Evidence—United States V. Charles: A Post-
Crawford Analysis of an Interpreter as a Declarant: Did the Eleventh Circuit Take its Decision a Bridge 
Too Far?, 37 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 308 (2015) (“The first indication that an interpreter was 
considered a mere language conduit was in the 1973 Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Ushakow.”). 
 114. Ushakow, 474 F.2d at 1245. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. The Ushakow court could have resolved the hearsay question more cleanly by simply relying 
on the conspirator exception to hearsay because all parties to the conversation (including the interpreter) 
appear to have been involved in the conspiracy. See United States v. Da Silva, 725 F.2d 828, 832 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 1983) (noting the alternative basis that could have been relied upon in Ushakow); see also Dutton v. 
Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970) (discussing the contours of the conspirator exception as it existed in federal 
courts prior to the 1975 adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence). 
 117. Ushakow, 474 F.2d at 1245. 
 118. See Da Silva, 725 F.2d at 832 (citing Ushakow to support the statement an interpreter simply 
serves as a “language conduit”); see also United States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 443 (9th Cir. 
2012) (same); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989) (same); People v. Romero, 
581 N.E.2d 1048, 1051 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991) (same). 
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Although the language conduit theory has its roots in Ushakow, the theory 
firmly took hold following the Second Circuit’s 1983 decision in United States v. Da 
Silva.119 There, the defendant was charged with unlawfully importing drugs.120 As 
part of the investigation, the defendant was interviewed by DEA agents.121 Because 
the defendant did not speak English, the DEA agents arranged for a U.S. Customs 
employee to serve as an interpreter during the interview.122 The case proceeded to 
trial, and one of the DEA agents testified (over objection) as to what the interpreter 
said that the defendant said.123 The defendant was convicted, and his appeal centered 
on whether the DEA agent’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay.124 
The Da Silva court rejected the defendant’s argument.125 In explaining its 
decision, the court amalgamated the agency theory and the language conduit 
theory.126 The court began its analysis by saying that an interpreter is “normally to 
be viewed as the agent of the defendant; hence, the translation is attributable to the 
defendant as his own admission and is properly characterized as non-hearsay.”127 
That presumption of agency, the court concluded, could only be negated if there was 
evidence that the interpreter had a “motive to mislead” or there is “reason to believe 
that the translation is inaccurate.”128 According to Da Silva, if the presumption of 
agency has not been rebutted by the defendant, then the interpreter “is no more than 
a language conduit”129 regardless of whether the interpreter was a government 
actor.130 
After Da Silva, federal and state courts nationwide opened their doors to 
testimony about what a non-testifying interpreter said the defendant said.131 Some 
 
 119. 725 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 120. Id. at 829. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 830. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 832. 
 126. Id. at 831–32. 
 127. Id. at 831. 
 128. Id. at 832. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. (“The fact that [the interpreter] was an employee of the government did not prevent him from 
acting as Da Silva’s agent for the purpose of translating and communicating Da Silva’s statements to [the 
DEA interviewer].”). 
 131. See, e.g., United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating that the interpreter’s 
“translations did not create double hearsay because [the interpreter] was merely a ‘language conduit’ and 
not a declarant under the hearsay rule”); United States v. Koskerides, 877 F.2d 1129, 1135 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(“The interpreter was no more than a language conduit and therefore his translation did not create an 
additional layer of hearsay.”); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 859–60 (11th Cir. 1985) (relying 
on Da Silva to conclude that statements made by the defendant to a government-provided interpreter were 
not barred by the rule against hearsay); United States v. Beltran, 761 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Da 
Silva and affirming the admission of statements made to an interpreter because “the translation may be 
considered an admission by the defendant, which is technically not hearsay”); People v. Gutierrez, 916 
P.2d 598, 600–01 (Colo. App. 1995) (discussing the language conduit and agency theories before 
concluding that the trial court correctly admitted statements the defendant made to an interpreter); State 
v. Robles, 458 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that as a general rule “a suspect’s choice 
to communicate through an interpreter signals that the interpreter is the suspect’s agent” and, therefore, 
the statements made to the interpreter are “non-hearsay”). 
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did so based on the agency theory,132 some based on the language conduit theory,133 
while others treated the two theories as one and the same.134 The most significant of 
these cases was the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Nazemian.135 Decided 
in 1991, Nazemian involved a defendant who was charged with conspiracy to 
distribute heroin.136 During the course of the investigation, the defendant spoke with 
an undercover DEA agent through an interpreter who had been provided by the 
DEA.137 The interpreter was not a witness at the defendant’s trial, but the DEA agent 
testified as to what the interpreter said that the defendant said.138 
On appeal, the defendant argued that the DEA agent’s testimony was 
inadmissible hearsay and violated the Confrontation Clause.139 After recognizing 
that “many of the early state cases” treated such testimony as inadmissible hearsay, 
the court pointed to Da Silva and other federal courts that have “recently” rejected 
the hearsay argument based on the agency and language conduit theories.140 After 
surveying the case law from its sister circuits, the Nazemian court identified four 
factors that are “relevant in determining whether the interpreter’s statements should 
be attributed to the defendant under either the agency or conduit theory.”141 Those 
factors are “[1] which party supplied the interpreter [,2] whether the interpreter had 
any motive to mislead or distort [,3] the interpreter’s qualifications and language 
skill, and [4] whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent 
with the statements as translated.”142 
The court applied those four factors and determined that the interpreter’s 
statements violated neither the hearsay rules nor the Confrontation Clause because 
the defendant and the interpreter were “identical.”143 The court reached that 
conclusion without any discussion or consideration of how language interpretation 
works. And, the court was unconcerned with the fact that the interpreter was chosen 
 
 132. See, e.g., State v. Umanzor, 682 S.E.2d 248, at *8 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (unpublished table 
decision) (applying agency theory to determine that statements made to an interpreter were not 
inadmissible hearsay); see also Barron-Gonzalez v. State, 426 S.W.3d 508, 514 (Ark. Ct. App. 2013) 
(same); Han Ok Song v. State, No. 08-13-0059-CR, 2015 WL 631163, at *5 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015) 
(same). 
 133. See, e.g., United States v. Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2012) (treating interpreters as 
“language conduits, whose translations of the defendant’s own statements are not hearsay”); State v. 
Rivera-Carrillo, 2002-Ohio-1013, 2002 WL 371950 at *17 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002) (holding that an 
interpreter “was nothing more than a language conduit between appellant and the detectives”); Cassidy v. 
State, 149 S.W.3d 712, 716 (Tex. App. 2004) (same). 
 134. See, e.g., United States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 443 (9th Cir. 2012) (appearing to treat 
the language conduit and agency theories as a single concept). 
 135. 948 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 136. Id. at 524. 
 137. Id. at 525 n.3. 
 138. Id. at 525. 
 139. Id. at 525–26. The defendant did not object to this testimony at trial, therefore, the appellate 
court’s review was limited to determining whether the trial court committed plain error. Id. at 525. 
 140. Id. at 526. 
 141. Id. at 527. 
 142. Id.; see United States v. Bermudez-Chavez, 473 F. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2012) (stating that 
Nazemian “articulat[ed] the test for determining whether translated statements should be considered 
statements of the speaker”). 
 143. Nazemian, 948 F.2d at 528. 
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by the DEA. Similarly, the court devoted no time to the issue of the interpreter’s 
training or experience. Instead, the Nazemian court stated in summary fashion that 
the defendant produced no “specific evidence of bias on the part of the interpreter.”144 
The court further assumed that “the translation must have been competent enough to 
allow communication.”145 
In the years since, Nazemian has been relied on by federal and state courts 
as a basis for rejecting both hearsay and Confrontation Clause objections to 
statements made by a non-testifying interpreter.146 Several prominent legal 
commentators have even endorsed the approach set forth in Nazemian.147 As a 
practical matter, most courts have devoted little discussion to the Nazemian factors 
and have created a de facto presumption that the statements are admissible. Consider 
the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Vidacack. There, the defendant—a 
non-English speaker—was interrogated by an ICE agent with the assistance of a 
government-supplied interpreter.148 The defendant was charged with making false 
statements on immigration forms, and at his trial the ICE agent testified as to what 
the interpreter (who did not testify) said the defendant said.149 The Fourth Circuit 
rejected the defendant’s claim that the ICE agent’s testimony was inadmissible 
hearsay. 
The Vidacack court explained that “an interpreter is no more than a 
language conduit and therefore his translation does not create an additional level of 
hearsay.”150 The court further explained that there is a “narrow exception” to this rule 
in those cases where the “particular facts case significant doubt upon the accuracy of 
a translated confession.”151 And, the court stated that Nazemian factors are designed 
to help determine if the “narrow exception” applies.152 The exception did not apply 
in this case, according to the Fourth Circuit, because the ICE agent testified that the 
interpreter “seemed extremely honest” and “was one of the best translators” the agent 
had worked with.153 
Most modern courts have allowed statements made by a non-testifying 
interpreter to be admitted unless the defendant comes forward with evidence to show 
 
 144. Id. at 527. 
 145. Id. at 528. 
 146. United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d 955, 959, 961 (9th Cir. 2012) (applying the four-factor 
test from Nazemian and concluding that statements made to an interpreter were properly admitted); United 
States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 442 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Nazemian and relying on the four-factor 
test); United States v. Vidacak, 553 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir. 2009) (same); United States v. Cordero, 18 
F.3d 1248, 1252–53 (5th Cir. 1994) (adopting the reasoning of Nazemian); State v. Lopez-Ramos, 913 
N.W.2d 695, 704, 706 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018) (same); Ross, supra note 14, at 1954 (stating that “courts 
often cite Nazemian in cases involving a defendant’s out of court statements to foreign-language 
interpreters”). 
 147. FISHMAN & MCKENNA, supra note 7, § 27:37 (discussing the Nazemian test); BERGMAN ET AL., 
supra note 8, § 8:7 (same). 
 148. United States v. Vidacack, 553 F.3d 344, 347 (4th Cir. 2009). 
 149. Id. at 347–48. 
 150. Id. at 352 (quoting United States v. Martinez–Gaytan, 213 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2000)). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (relying on a Fifth Circuit case that adopted the Nazemian factors). 
 153. Id. 
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that the interpreter was biased or unreliable.154 The fact that the interpreter worked 
for the police department or was otherwise chosen by the government generally has 
not prevented the courts from admitting the statements.155 There are, however, an 
extremely small number of state courts that have adhered to the traditional view that 
statements made by an interpreter outside of court should be excluded unless (1) the 
interpreter testifies regarding the statements, or (2) there is clear evidence showing 
that the defendant selected the interpreter to serve as his agent.156 
It is also worth pointing out that a few modern courts have admitted 
statements made by a non-testifying interpreter via a different route: the residual 
hearsay exception set forth in Rule 807.157 As a general matter, the residual exception 
applies if a statement (1) “is not specifically covered by a hearsay exception in Rule 
803 or 804”; (2) “has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (3) it 
is offered as evidence of a material fact; (4) it is more probative on the point for 
which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through 
reasonable efforts; and (5) admitting it will best serve the purposes of [the Rules of 
Evidence] and the interests of justice.”158 
One of the courts that has relied on the residual exception in the context of 
statements made to an interpreter is the Oregon Court of Appeals. In State v. 
Montoya-Franco, the defendant was interviewed with the assistance of two 
interpreters employed by the police department.159 At trial, the statements that the 
defendant made to the interpreters were admitted through testimony by the officers 
who conducted the interview.160 Prior to offering the testimony, the prosecution 
introduced evidence regarding the training, experience, and trustworthiness of the 
 
 154. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Gaytan, 213 F.3d 890, 893 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that “if a 
defendant does not take issue with the accuracy of a translation, as reported by one who heard the 
translation, during the course of the translated conversation or subsequent events, a hearsay problem rarely 
arises,” but concluding that this case presented sufficient concerns to require additional consideration by 
the district court before permitting the statements to be admitted at the defendant’s suppression hearing); 
People v. Morel, 798 N.Y.S.2d 315, 317 (N.Y. App. Term. 2005) (stating that precedent only requires 
“that the proof permit an inference of the declarant’s actual or implied authorization to the translator to 
perform that function to establish the necessary agency relationship”). 
 155. See, e.g., State v. Robles, 458 N.W.2d 818, 821 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a police 
officer who interpreted during another officer’s interview of the defendant was the defendant’s agent for 
purposes of the hearsay analysis); United States v. Alvarez, 755 F.2d 830, 859–60 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(treating an ATF agent who interpreted for another ATF agent as the defendant’s agent). 
 156. See, e.g., Durbin v. Hardin, 775 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. App. 1989) (finding that statements made 
by the defendant to an interpreter were hearsay and refusing to apply the agency theory because “there is 
nothing in the record to support an adoption by [the defendant] of the interpreter as her agent”). 
 157. See, e.g., State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2012); State v. Terrazas, 783 P.2d 
803, 808 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). 
 158. FED. R. EVID. 807(a). Additionally, the residual exception cannot be used unless the proponent 
of the evidence provides pre-trial notice of its intent to rely on the exception. 
 159. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d at 940. 
 160. Id. at 940. The interpreters testified at trial, but their testimony was limited to establishing their 
training and experience. Id. at 940. The interviewing officer was called to testify as to what the interpreters 
told him that the defendant said. Id. at 940. 
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interpreters.161 The trial court determined that the testimony was admissible under 
the residual exception.162 
The Montoya-Franco court affirmed and began by making clear that the 
statements made by the interpreters to the interviewing officer were hearsay that 
would be inadmissible unless an exception or exemption applied. As the court put it: 
“An out-of-court translation of a non-English speaker’s statements to a third-party 
constitutes hearsay because the interpreter’s translation constitutes an assertion of 
the English meaning of the original statement.”163 After distinguishing a prior 
decision that refused to apply the residual exception,164 the court explained that the 
exception applied here because the prosecution laid the appropriate foundation.165 
More specifically, the prosecution called both interpreters who discussed their 
training, experience, and the manner in which they interpreted the defendant’s 
statements.166 The prosecution also established that the statements were highly 
probative and that admission of them served the purposes of the Rules of Evidence.167 
By relying on the residual exception, the court—unlike most of its sister 
courts nationwide—necessarily recognized that neither the language conduit theory 
nor the agency theory provided a basis for admitting the testimony.168 As explained 
below, the Montoya-Franco was correct in that regard. It was also correct that if a 
statement made by a non-testifying interpreter is to be admitted under the hearsay 
rules, the only available option (given the lack of any other applicable hearsay 
exemption or exception) is compliance with the substantial requirements of the 
residual exception.169 Of course, a finding that a hearsay statement is admissible 
under the residual exception does not mean that it ultimately will be allowed in a 
defendant’s criminal trial because (as discussed in Part II below) of the Confrontation 
Clause. 
 
 161. Id. at 943. 
 162. Id. at 943–44. 
 163. Id. at 941. 
 164. Id. at 943 (distinguishing State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, 188 P.3d 268 (Or. 2008) on the basis that 
the prosecution in that case had failed to lay an adequate foundation for admission under the residual 
clause). 
 165. Id. at 943–44; see also State v. Terrazas, 783 P.2d 803, 808 (Ariz Ct. App. 1989) (affirming 
admission of statements made by the defendant to an interpreter under the residual exception); State v. 
Tinajero, 935 P.2d 928, 932–33 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (same). 
 166. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d at 943–44. 
 167. Id. at 944. 
 168. The residual exception requires a finding that no other exception or exemption applies; thus, by 
resorting to the residual exception the court necessarily rejected the other approaches. Moreoever, the 
Montoya-Franco court noted “we reject without discussion defendant’s unpreserved contention that the 
evidence did not qualify under [the residual exception] on the ground that the translated statements may 
have been ‘covered’ by another hearsay exception . . . as an agent’s statement.” Id. at 944 n.2. 
 169. It should be the rare case where a statement made by a non-testifying interpreter will be admitted 
under the residual exception. The requirement that the statement have circumstantial guarantees of 
trustworthiness will pose a substantial obstacle, especially in those cases where the interpreter is a police 
officer or other government employee. Additionally, it will be difficult for the prosecution to establish 
that admitting a non-testifying interpreter’s statements will best serve the interests of justice given the 
accuracy concerns surrounding the interpretations provided by non-certified and often poorly trained 
police interpreters. 
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C. The language conduit and agency theories are fundamentally flawed. 
“Wrong is wrong, even if everyone is doing it.” This pearl of wisdom, often 
attributed to St. Augustine,170 is applicable to the language conduit and agency 
theories that most modern courts have used to sidestep the hearsay problem presented 
when the government offers evidence of what a non-testifying interpreter said the 
defendant said. As explained below, both theories are fundamentally flawed, 
inconsistent with the law, and rest on faulty factual premises. 
1. Interpreters are not language conduits 
The interpreter is “merely a language conduit.”171 This phrase has been 
repeated in case after case to justify admitting out-of-court statements made by a 
non-testifying interpreter. But, it is demonstrably false. The entire language conduit 
theory is based on a misconception about what interpreters do and how language 
interpretation works.172 
To understand what interpreters do, it is perhaps best to begin with an 
explanation of what they do not do. Interpreting is not “merely a process of decoding, 
or transliteration.”173 An interpreter “does not provide for a one-to-one 
correspondence between words or concepts in different languages.”174 And, an 
interpreter is not “an invisible pipe, with words entering in one language and 
existing—completely unmodified—in another language.”175 The act of interpreting 
is incredibly complex, and an interpreter’s function is not to provide a literal word-
for-word translation.176 
Rather, an interpreter’s job is to convey meaning from one language (the 
source language), to another language (the target language).177 It is often said that 
“interpreters do not interpret words; they interpret concepts.”178 To perform this job, 
an interpreter must make a “series of complex judgments based on numerous verbal 
and non-verbal cues—a task that requires considerable skill and an understanding of 
cultural differences, idioms, dialect idiosyncrasies, and possible multiple meanings 
 
 170. GOOD READS, https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/126110-right-is-right-even-if-no-one-is-
doing-it (last visited Apr. 3, 2019). 
 171. United States v. Ushakow, 474 F.2d 1244, 1245 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 172. See Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 528 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (referring to the language 
conduit theory as a “fallacy or misconception that ignores the reality of language interpretation”). 
 173. Muneer I. Ahmad, Interpreting Communities: Lawyering Across Language Difference, 54 UCLA 
L. Rev. 999, 1031 (2007). 
 174. United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013). 
 175. Brief for the Massachusetts Ass’n of Court Interpreters, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Ye v. United States, 808 F.3ed 395, No. 10576 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Susan Berk-Seligson, 
The Bilingual Courtroom 219 (2002)). 
 176. Brief of Interpreting and Translation Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Ye v. 
United States at 4 (U.S. Supreme Court No. 15-1002) (2016). 
 177. Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324. 
 178. National Association of Judiciary Interpreters and Translators, Frequently Asked Questions, 
Court and Legal Interpreting and Translating, https://najit.org/resources/the-profession/#faq (last visited 
Jan. 13, 2019). 
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of words and phrases.”179 The interpreting process is more art than science,180 and it 
requires considerable discretion on the part of the interpreter.181 As one experienced 
interpreter explained, “[t]here is no such thing as a perfect translation 
. . .  Interpretations are performed by humans and humans are not machines . . . 
Because there are no definite rules or vocabulary, two interpreters may give different 
renditions of the same passage and both may be correct.”182 
To perform effectively, an interpreter “must listen to what is being said, 
comprehend the message, abstract the entire message from the words and word order, 
store the idea, search his or her memory for the conceptual and semantic matches, 
and reconstruct the message (keeping the same register or level of difficulty as in the 
source language).”183 To do this effectively, an interpreter must have “an extensive 
vocabulary of great depth and breadth in two languages,” as well as an understanding 
of a “large number of semantic fields.”184 An interpreter also needs to be aware of 
“how native speakers use certain words and syntactic structures in context, and what 
connotations certain words have for speakers from a particular region or social 
group.”185 This requires knowledge of “the variety of meaning relations among 
words to one another, including synonymy, homonymy (i.e., homonyms, 
homophones, and homographs) and polysemy.”186 
Contrary to what many courts appear to believe, a person is not qualified to 
serve as an interpreter simply because he or she is bilingual.187 It has been said that 
bilingualism “does not qualify one to interpret, just like having two hands does not 
qualify one to be a concert pianist.”188 Fluency in the source language and the target 
 
 179. Brief for the Massachusetts Ass’n of Court Interpreters, Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, Ye v. United States, 808 F.3d 395, No. 10576 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 180. Debra L. Hovland, Errors in Interpretation: Why Plain Error is Not Plain, 11 Law & Ineq. 473, 
487 (1993). 
 181. See Roxana Cardenas, “You Don’t Have to Hear, Just Interpret!”: How Ethnocentrism in the 
California Courts Impedes Equal Access to the Courts for Spanish Speakers, COURT REVIEW 27 (Fall 
2001), https://eulita.eu/wp/wp-content/uploads/files/CardenasYouDon%27tHavetoHear%2 
CJustInterpret.pdf; see also Ross, supra note 14 at 1966 (stating that “translation involves subjectivity 
and discretion”). 
 182. Id. at 27; see also Michael B. Shulman, Note, No Hablo Ingles: Court Interpretation as a Major 
Obstacle to Fairness for Non-English Speaking Defendants, 46 VAND. L. REV. 175, 177 (1993) (“Perfect 
interpretations do not exist, as no interpretation will convey precisely the same meaning as the original 
testimony.”). 
 183. State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 939 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (quoting Cathy Rhodes, Court 
Certification, 1 Access to Justice Journal 1, 2 (1999)). 
 184. DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 726–27. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. at 729. 
 187. Id. at 13 (“There is also a persistent belief that court interpreting is a role that any bilingual can 
perform—including university professors, secretaries, court librarians, police officers, friends, relatives, 
lawyers, or any other untested, alleged bilingual.”); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court 
Interpreter Orientation Manual and Glossary, 22 (May 8, 2014), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federal-court-interpreter-orientation-manual_0.pdf (“A 
common error is the belief that any person who knows two languages can interpret.”). 
 188. Cardenas, supra note 181 at 26 (attributing the quote to Jon Leeth, who previously worked at the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts as the director of the Office of Court Reporting and Interpreting 
Services). 
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language is simply the starting line for an interpreter.189 An interpreter needs “deep 
familiarity” with both cultures190 because “much of the information required to 
determine the speaker’s meaning is not contained in the words of the speaker, but 
instead is supplied by the listener. Comprehension therefore depends upon a shared 
perceptual context such that the inferences the listener draws are the ones the speaker 
intended.”191 
The difficulty inherent in interpreting is compounded when the 
conversations being interpreted involve legal issues and the specialized jargon that 
pervades the legal system.192 Absent training and experience, it can be very hard for 
an interpreter to appropriately convey these complicated concepts. Additionally, the 
stakes are incredibly high when an interpreter is working with a non-English speaker 
who finds himself involved in the criminal justice system.193 In that context, a 
“mistranslation of a simple fact can cause irreparable damage to the individual and 
to the justice process.”194 Sadly, there are numerous examples of cases where an 
interpreter incorrectly translated a defendant’s statements with disastrous 
consequences.195 
Although the federal court system196 and many state court systems197 
require courtroom interpreters to complete a certification process to ensure minimal 
competency, there are no similar requirements for individuals who serve as 
interpreters during police interrogations.198 Further evidencing the difference 
between being bilingual and being competent to interpret is the fact that less than 
10% of examinees are able to pass the Federal Court Interpreter Certification 
 
 189. Elena M. De Jongh, Foreign Language Interpreters in the Courtroom: The Case for Linguistic 
and Cultural Proficiency, 75 The Modern Language Journal, 285 (1991). 
 190. Id. at 288. 
 191. Ahmad, supra note 173 at 1036. 
 192. DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 733 
 193. Id. at 167 (explaining the importance of accurate interpreting in the legal system because “[o]ne 
misinterpreted word, phrase, or tone could mean the difference between a fair trial and a grave injustice”). 
 194. Id. at 40; see also Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Court Interpreter Orientation 
Manual and Glossary, 25 (May 8, 2014), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federal-court-
interpreter-orientation-manual_0.pdf (“The potentially grave consequences of inaccurate legal 
interpretation mandate that great skill and caution be utilized by interpreters.”). 
 195. See Hon. Lynn W. Davis et al., The Changing Face of Justice: A Survey of Recent Cases Involving 
Courtroom Interpretation, 7 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 18–24 (2004) (providing examples of 
circumstances where errors by interpreters negatively impacted criminal defendants); see also State v. 
Ramirez, 732 N.E.2d 1065, 1067–70 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (reversing the defendant’s conviction based 
on errors committed by the interpreter when conveying the Miranda warnings to defendant). 
 196. See 18 U.S.C. § 1827 (requiring the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts to create a 
certification program for interpreters who appear in the federal courts); see also FED. R. EVID. 604 (stating 
that a courtroom interpreter “must be qualified”). 
 197. See Nat’l Ass’n of Judiciary Interpreters & Translators, Language Assistance for Law 
Enforcement, NAJIT POSITION PAPER 3 (Mar. 31, 2006), https://najit.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/09/LanguageforLawEnforcement2006.pdf (stating that “35 states belong to the 
Consortium for State Court Interpreter Certification, a project of the National Center for State Courts”). 
 198. DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 444 (explaining that the “Court Interpreters Act of 
1978 and similar state statutes that apply to the courts, do not explicitly apply to the criminal investigation 
process, including arrest, detention, and custodial interrogation”). 
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Examination.199 It is imperative to have competent and skilled interpreters in the 
courtroom, but what happens in a police interrogation room often dictates the result 
at trial. The erroneous translation of even one word during a police interrogation can 
be the difference between a conviction and an acquittal.200 Thus, the U.S. Department 
of Justice has recommended that police agencies use certified interpreters when 
interrogating a suspect who does not speak English.201 
Nevertheless, police agencies often use “untrained, untested, foreign-
language-speaking law enforcement personnel” to serve as interpreters.202 The police 
agencies wrongly assume that an individual’s ability to “speak two languages to any 
degree automatically qualifies” them to engage in the complex process of 
interpreting in a “high-stakes setting.”203 In many jurisdictions, there are no 
standards, no certifications, and no specialized training for these stationhouse 
interpreters.204 Rather, an individual is tasked with serving as interpreter simply 
because he or she is available and possesses some ability to speak a foreign 
language.205 
Studies conducted by linguistics experts have identified alarming problems 
in police interviews conducted using these stationhouse interpreters.206 One of the 
studies looked at how interpreters conveyed the Miranda warnings to suspects. It 
found situations where the warnings were “severely distorted.”207 Below are a few 
of the more egregious examples: 
(1) “You have the right to pass liquids through pipes, silence.” 
(2) “If you remain silent, everything will be used against you in court.” 
(3) If you wants . . . with us without a university graduate or a . . . you have 
the right to stop the tips of something.208 
Another study found that some police agencies were using interpreters 
whose language skills were at “advanced beginner or low intermediate level,”209 
which is plainly insufficient for the criminal justice environment. 
 
 199. Id. at 471. (reporting that 5% of test-takers passed the examination); see also Florida Bar Journal, 
Court Interpreting: Linguistic Presence v. Linguistic Absence (July/Aug. 2018), 
https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/court-interpreting-linguistic-presence-v-linguistic-
absence/ (stating that the overall certification rate is 8%). 
 200. See DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 40; 
 201. Department of Justice, Guidance to Federal Financial Assistance Recipients Regarding Title VI 
Prohibition Against National Origin Discrimination Affecting Limited English Proficient Persons, 67 Fed. 
Reg. 41,455, 41,461 (June 18, 2002). 
 202. DUEÑA GONZÁLEZ ET AL., supra note 2, at 445. 
 203. Id. 
 204. Id. (stating that police agencies “rely on untrained, untrusted, foreign-language-speaking law 
enforcement personnel to perform complex tasks such as interrogating, translating, and interpreting in 
languages in which these employees have no specialized training”). 
 205. Id. at 445. 
 206. Id. at 474–75 (discussing various studies that have identified errors of interpreters used by law 
enforcement agencies). 
 207. Id. at 475. 
 208. Id. at 475–76. See also State v. Ramirez, 732 N.E.2d 1065, 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (reversing 
the defendant’s conviction because a police-provided interpreter failed to accurately interpret the Miranda 
warnings prior to the defendant making an incriminating statement). 
 209. Id. at 474. 
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These errors are troubling and highlight the dangers inherent in courts 
assuming that an interpreter does nothing more than mechanically and precisely pass 
along information. Some might respond to this criticism by arguing that one of the 
factors in the Nazemian language conduit test is “whether actions taken subsequent 
to the conversation were consistent with the statements translated.”210 The problem, 
however, is that in most cases of interpretative error “the existence of the failure is 
not directly knowable” because “neither [the defendant nor the interviewing officer] 
possesses the linguistic abilities to verify the integrity of the interpretation.”211 
Professor Maneer Ahmad has referred to this type of issue as a “black box 
problem”—neither party knows what the other is actually saying, thus they lack the 
ability to identify and correct any interpretation errors.212 
At the end of the day, interpreting is “an imprecise and subjective process 
in which an interpreter must make split-second judgments based on context, cultural 
understanding, evaluation of multiple meanings of a word, and a host of other 
factors.”213 Far from being a mere pass-through, an interpreter is an actual participant 
in the conversation who makes “countless subjective decisions . . . in the process of 
understanding the speaker’s message, converting it to a second language, and 
delivering it to the listener.”214 
Thus, when an interpreter tells a police officer that the defendant said X, Y, 
or Z, the interpreter is a separate “declarant” for purposes of the hearsay rules.215 He 
or she is making an “assertion”216 that the words the defendant said in a foreign 
language have a certain meaning in English. When an interpreter “translates words 
from a non-English language into English, the rendering of an opinion [by the 
interpreter] is inherent in the situation.”217 The words spoken by the interpreter are 
the interpreter’s words, and not the defendant’s.218 The early courts had it right—a 
“witness may not testify to another’s statements made in conversation through an 
interpreter, because such testimony, being based on interpretation rather than 
personal knowledge, is hearsay.”219 
The language conduit theory’s dominance and staying power among the 
modern courts is particularly surprising given that it was born in a per curiam opinion 
(Ushakow) that lacked any analysis or discussion of the issue. Drawn to its simplicity 
and surface-level appeal, courts across the country have adopted the theory without 
any serious consideration of its underlying foundation. Of the relatively few modern 
 
 210. United States v. Nazemian, 948 F.2d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 211. Ahmad, supra note 173, at 1036. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Brief for the Mass. Ass’n of Court Interpreters, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
4, Ye v. United States, 808 F.3d 395, No. 10576 (9th Cir. 2015). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See FED. R. EVID. 801(b) (defining “declarant” to mean “the person who made the statement”). 
 216. See FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (defining “statement” to mean “a person’s oral assertion, written 
assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an assertion”). 
 217. Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 529 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (alteration to the original in the 
quoted text) (quoting Malekar v. State, 26 Md. App. 498, 508 (1975)). 
 218. See State v. Montoya-Franco, 282 P.3d 939, 941 (Or. Ct. App. 2012) (“An out-of-court translation 
of a non-English speaker’s statements to a third party constitutes hearsay because the interpreter’s 
translation constitutes an assertion of the English meaning of the original statement.”). 
 219. Gallegos v. People, 403 P.2d 864, 868 (Colo. 1965). 
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courts that have dug into the issue and tested the premise on which the theory is built, 
all have correctly concluded that the theory is flawed and irreconcilable with the 
reality of language interpretation.220 As the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland 
put it, the language conduit theory is a “fallacy or misconception that ignores the 
reality of language interpretation.”221 
The language conduit theory also represents a fundamental 
misunderstanding of how the hearsay rules operate. Even if the interpreter was 
simply a repeater of the defendant’s statements who provided the interviewing 
officer with a verbatim account of what the defendant said, the interpreter’s out-of-
court statement would still be hearsay.222 It would be no different than the following 
scenario: Defendant whispers to Officer 1 “I robbed the bank.” Officer 1 turns to 
Officer 2 and says, “Defendant said he robbed the bank.” If the prosecution called 
Officer 2 to testify, it would present a classic hearsay-within-hearsay problem. Thus, 
Rule 805 would require an exception or exemption for each statement.223 The 
statement from Defendant to Officer 1 would fall within the party opponent 
statement exemption in Rule 801(d)(2), but the statement from Officer 1 to Officer 
2 would not fall within an exception or exemption. Thus, Officer 2’s testimony would 
be inadmissible. It does not matter that Officer 2 was simply parroting, verbatim, 
what Defendant told Officer 1.224 It is classic hearsay.225 Given that the hearsay rules 
prevent the admission of a defendant’s exact words (as spoken and understood in 
English) if they were repeated to the witness by a non-testifying third party, it strains 
logic to say that the hearsay rules permit the admission of a statement that a third-
party heard from an interpreter who said the defendant uttered the words in a foreign 
language. 
 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013) (rejecting the language 
conduit theory in the context of the Confrontation Clause); State v. Rodriguez-Castillo, 188 P.3d 268, 
272–73 (Or. 2008) (rejecting the language conduit theory and finding that the interpreter’s statement was 
an independent assertion for purposes of the hearsay rules). See also United States v. Romo-Chavez, 681 
F.3d 955, 966 (9th Cir. 2012) (Berzon, J., concurring) (“We should not bend the hearsay rules out of shape 
so as to treat statements by one person as if they were statements by another, unless the equivalence is 
proven.”). 
 221. Taylor v. State, 130 A.3d 509, 528 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (rejecting the language conduit 
theory in the context of a Confrontation Clause). 
 222. See State v. Derryberry, 528 P.2d 1034, 1036 (Or. 1974) (en banc) (“The testimony of the police 
officers that they heard the witness Clark say that he heard the defendant say that he stole the furniture 
was ‘double hearsay.’ Thus, that testimony was inadmissible as substantive evidence upon the ground that 
it was hearsay unless it came within some exception to the general rule prohibiting the use of hearsay 
testimony.”). 
 223. See CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 8:79 (5th ed. 2012) (“To 
satisfy FRE 805, each statement in the chain must fit ‘an exception,’ and this term should be read also to 
reach statements that qualify as ‘not hearsay’ under FRE 801(d).”). 
 224. See Moseley v. Commonwealth, 960 S.W.2d 460, 462–63 (Ky. 1997) (concluding that the trial 
court should not have allowed a detective to repeat what other first responders told the detective the 
defendant said). See also State v. Reinhart, 811 N.W.2d 258, 264 (Neb. 2012) (finding that a state trooper’s 
testimony about what an informant told him the defendant said was inadmissible hearsay that the trial 
court improperly admitted). 
 225. See generally Hickey v. Settlemier, 864 P.2d 372, 377 (Or. 1993) (en banc) (holding that a 
reporter’s statement on a videotape repeating what the defendant said was inadmissible hearsay). 
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The concept of a person serving as a “language conduit” is entirely 
inconsistent with how the hearsay rules—particularly the hearsay-within- hearsay 
rule—operate. The modern courts should take a lesson from their 19th and early 20th 
century predecessors by rejecting the language conduit theory and holding that out-
of-court statements made by a non-testifying interpreter are inadmissible hearsay. 
2. The “agency theory” contradicts agency law. 
The agency theory that many modern courts have applied to admit 
statements made by a non-testifying interpreter is inconsistent with well settled 
principles of agency law. The problem is not with the theory itself—a defendant can 
make an interpreter his agent, and if he does so, the agent’s statements are admissible 
under the hearsay exemption found in Rule 801(d)(2)(D). Rather, the problem is one 
of application. More specifically, in applying the agency theory the courts have 
created a “presumption of agency” that has resulted in interpreters being deemed a 
defendant’s agent in circumstances where that conclusion lacks legal support. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) exempts from the rule against hearsay any statements 
“made by the party’s agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that 
relationship and while it existed.”226 The determination of whether an individual was 
the party’s agent is a “preliminary question” that must be resolved by the trial court 
under Rule 104(a).227 The proponent of the evidence has the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that an agency relationship existed between the 
declarant and the party.228 The court must consider the statement in making its 
decision, but the statement itself is insufficient to establish the existence of an agency 
relationship.229 Thus, the proponent of the statement must prove an agency 
relationship “by independent evidence before out-of-court statements by a purported 
agent can be deemed admissions by a party-opponent.”230 To satisfy this burden, the 
proponent must come forward with “more than intuitive judgments emanating from 
broad generalities.”231 
When determining whether the proponent has met its burden, the courts 
apply the common law of agency.232 The common law of agency is reflected in the 
 
 226. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). 
 227. See FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about whether a 
witness is qualified, a privilege exists, or evidence is admissible.”); FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory 
committee’s note to 1997 amendment (making clear that Rule 104(a) applies to the determination of 
whether an agency relationship existed under Rule 801(d)(2)(D)). See also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 
F.3d 767, 775 (9th Cir. 1996) (“The existence of an agency relationship is a question for the judge under 
Rule 104(a) . . . .”). 
 228. See United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495, 507 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining that for purposes of 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D), the government was required to prove agency “by a preponderance of the evidence”); 
Lippay v. Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1497 (3d Cir. 1993). 
 229. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 
 230. Gomez v. Rivera Rodriguez, 344 F.3d 103, 116 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 231. Id. at 117. 
 232. See id. at 116; WEISSENBERGER & DUANE, supra note 30 at § 801.20 (“The substantive law of 
agency governs whether the declarant had speaking authority.”). 
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Restatement (Second) of Agency.233 And according to the Restatement, “[a]gency is 
the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person 
to another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent 
by the other to so act.”234 The term “fiduciary relation” means that the agent’s 
“function is to act for the benefit” of the principal.235 
To establish an agency relationship, three elements must be established: 
“[1] manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for him, [2] the agent’s 
acceptance of the undertaking and [3] the understanding of the parties that the 
principal is to be in control of the undertaking.”236 Although agency can be 
established without a formal contract, it is a “consensual relationship” that cannot be 
established without one person (the principal) manifesting an intent that another 
person (the agent) “shall act in his behalf and the other person consents to represent 
him.”237 Manifestation can be done “orally or in writing, or by some other conduct 
by the principal which may be interpreted as an intent to appoint an agent.”238 The 
well settled rule that “agency is never to be presumed”239 is especially important for 
the purposes of the current discussion. 
Undoubtedly, in some situations an interpreter may be the defendant’s agent 
and, therefore, the interpreter’s statements would be attributed to the defendant and 
admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(D).240 Consistent with the law set forth above, the 
agency theory should not be applied unless the prosecution shows by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant manifested an intention to have the 
interpreter serve as his agent. The idea that an interpreter who works for, or was 
provided by, a government entity is presumptively the agent of a criminal defendant 
during a police interview flies in the face of agency law and basic common sense. 
Do the courts sincerely believe that if Detective 1 uses his bilingual 
colleague, Detective 2, to interpret during an interrogation of a non-English speaking 
suspect that the suspect has the right to control Detective 2 in the manner that a 
principal controls an agent? Is it reasonable to assume that in such a situation 
Detective 2 has a duty of loyalty to the suspect the way that an agent does to a 
principal? Does it make sense to say that a non-English speaking suspect has 
 
 233. See Kolstad v. Amer. Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 542 (1999) (“The common law as codified in 
the Restatement (Second) of Agency (1957) provides a useful starting point for defining this general 
common law.”). 
 234. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1958). 
 235. WARREN A. SEAVEY, AGENCY § 3 C. (1964). 
 236. Id. at cmt. b. 
 237. HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP 
§ 12 (2d ed. 1990). 
 238. Id. at § 26, cmt. a. 
 239. Karl Rove & Co. v. Thornburgh, 39 F.3d 1273, 1296 (5th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). See also 
Kuenzle v. HTM Sport-UND Freizeitgeräte AG, 102 F.3d 453, 459 (10th Cir. 1996) (“An agency 
relationship cannot be presumed, but rather must be clearly demonstrated.”); Dickinson v. City of 
Huntsville, 822 So. 2d 411, 416 (Ala. 2001) (“Agency may not be presumed.”); GREG ABBOTT & DOUG 
COULSON, 5 TEX. PRAC. GUIDE BUS. & COM. LITIG. § 28.29 (2018) (“The law does not presume the 
existence of an agency relationship.”). 
 240. See, e.g., Chao v. State, 478 So. 2d 30, 32 (Fla. 1985) (affirming the introduction of statements 
made by a defendant to an interpreter where the interpreter was a bilingual relative of the defendant who 
he brought to the police station for the purpose of interpreting). 
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voluntarily manifested an intent to make Detective 2 his agent when the topic was 
never discussed, the suspect was not given the option of providing his own 
interpreter, and the suspect has had no opportunity to ascertain the training and 
experience of Detective 2? Is it reasonable to conclude that a defendant who has no 
other way of speaking with Detective 1 has impliedly made Detective 2 his agent 
simply by speaking to him? 
The answer to all of these questions is “no.” As the Court of Appeals of 
Arizona put it, the agency theory “[is] an artifice . . . where the interpreter has been 
selected by prosecutorial forces investigating the defendant’s participation in a 
crime.”241 Of the modern cases that have relied on the agency theory to admit 
statements made by a non-testifying interpreter, few have considered agency law 
principles or rigorously analyzed the issue. Although Rule 801(d)(2)(D) and the law 
of agency both require that the party claiming an agency relationship prove one 
existed, most courts today have done the opposite when it comes to statements made 
to an interpreter. They have impermissibly created a presumption of agency and 
placed the burden on the opposing party to rebut the presumption by proving that an 
agency relationship did not exist.242 
Some courts have strayed so far from the governing legal principles that 
reading their opinions seems a bit like being in Alice in Wonderland’s world where 
is up is down and down is up. For example, in People v. Quan Hong Ye, the New 
York Supreme Court’s Appellate Division relied on the agency theory to affirm the 
admission of an officer’s testimony about what another (bilingual) officer told him 
the defendant said during an interview.243 According to the court, there was no 
evidence that the interpreter was biased or the interpretation inaccurate.244 Thus, the 
agency exception applied “even though the interpreter was a law enforcement officer 
primarily acting on behalf of the Police Department.”245 
It is difficult to square the Hong Ye court’s conclusion with agency law 
principles—chiefly the rule that an agent acts for the principal and is under the 
principal’s control. Aside from being inconsistent with well settled legal principles, 
this type of approach is fundamentally unfair to non-English speaking suspects. A 
suspect who finds himself in a police interview with an officer and an interpreter he 
 
 241. State v. Terrazas, 783 P.2d 803, 808 n.3 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989). See also Rosell v. State, 433 So. 
2d 1260, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (referring to the state’s argument that the defendant had adopted 
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 242. See, e.g., United States v. Santacruz, 480 F. App’x 441, 442–43 (9th Cir. 2012) (treating a 
sheriff’s deputy as the defendant’s “‘language conduit’ or agent” and stating that the defendant “presented 
no evidence supporting an assertion that [the deputy] was likely to mislead or distort the translations”); 
State v. Robles, 458 N.W.2d 818, 822 (Wisc. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that a police officer was the 
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an inaccurate interpretation). 
 243. People v. Quan Hong Ye, 889 N.Y.S.2d 556, 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009). 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. (emphasis added). 
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has never met before should not be treated as though he has voluntarily chosen the 
interpreter as his agent.246 When the interpreter is another police officer or employee 
of the police agency, he or she is laboring under (at the very least) an appearance of 
a conflict of interest. Because of this “inherent conflict of interest” language 
specialists have concluded that “a police officer or detective should not be assigned 
as an interpreter in any custodial interrogation.”247 Nevertheless, it happens 
routinely. 
Rule 801(d)(2)(D) was intended to apply in situations where a principal-
agent relationship truly existed—i.e., attorney and client, employer and employee.248 
Those situations are world’s away from a non-English speaker who is suspected of 
a crime being interrogated with the assistance of an interpreter he does not know, did 
not select, has no ability to control, and is associated with the investigating agency. 
There will be situations where a proper analysis of the applicable legal principles 
results in an interpreter being viewed as the defendant’s agent.249 But, the 
overwhelming majority of modern cases applying the agency theory do not involve 
such situations. The courts should reject the “presumption of agency” that has 
prevailed in recent years and replace it with an approach that requires the proponent 
of the statement to establish that the interpreter was, in fact, the defendant’s agent as 
that term has been defined in agency law. 
II. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE PROBLEM 
When the government seeks to introduce out-of-court statements against a 
criminal defendant, the hearsay rules are just the first hurdle to admissibility that 
must be cleared. If a statement clears the hearsay hurdle, then it becomes necessary 
to consider an even more substantial hurdle—the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment.250 A small number of courts have addressed the Confrontation Clause 
issue presented by introducing statements since the Supreme Court’s groundbreaking 
2004 decision in Crawford v. Washington.251 Of those courts, a slim majority have 
found that a defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to cross examine the 
 
 246. See generally State v. Mitjans, 408 N.W.2d 824, 831 (Minn. 1987) (“[T]he case for admission of 
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 251. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
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interpreter.252 The federal circuit courts are split on this issue, with the Fifth and 
Ninth Circuits finding no Confrontation Clause violation, and the Eleventh Circuit 
reaching the opposite conclusion.253 
Given the importance of the issue and the existence of a circuit split, the 
issue is ripe for Supreme Court review. Absent a drastic change in the Court’s 
understanding of the Confrontation Clause, the approach endorsed by the Eleventh 
Circuit should prevail because statements made by a non-testifying interpreter are 
“testimonial” as that term has been defined by Supreme Court precedent. The 
statements, therefore, cannot be admitted unless the interpreter testifies, or the 
defendant had a prior opportunity to cross examine the interpreter. To understand 
why that is true, a brief overview of the Court’s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence 
is necessary. 
A. Overview of the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence 
The Confrontation Clause provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”254 
It is beyond peradventure that the “central concern of the Confrontation Clause is to 
ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting it to 
rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”255 
The Court has made clear that “rigorous testing” means cross examination—”the 
greatest legal engine ever imagined for the discovery of truth.”256 Although what the 
Confrontation Clause requires has been relatively easy to determine, the question of 
when the Clause applies has proven difficult to answer. Clearly, the Confrontation 
Clause guarantees a criminal defendant the right to cross examine those “who bear 
testimony against him.”257 But, what does that mean? Who is a “witness” against the 
defendant? 
The Supreme Court has grappled with those questions, with varying results. 
The past forty years can be divided into two eras of Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. The first era began in 1980 with the Court’s decision in Ohio v. 
Roberts.258 In Roberts, the Court rejected a literal reading of the Confrontation 
Clause because “it would require, on objection, the exclusion of any statement made 
by a declarant not present at trial” and “would abrogate virtually every hearsay 
 
 252. See United States v. Ye, 808 F.3d 395, 401–02 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding no Confrontation Clause 
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exception.”259 The Roberts Court determined that the Confrontation Clause 
permitted an absent witness’s out-of-court statement to be admitted if the statement 
“bears adequate indicia of reliability.”260 A prosecutor could show that a statement 
was sufficiently reliable by either showing that the statement fell within a “firmly 
rooted hearsay exception” or possessed “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness.”261 The Roberts approach was favorable to the prosecution because 
it rarely led to the exclusion of statements that were admissible under the hearsay 
rules.262 
The second era began in 2004 when the Supreme Court issued its watershed 
decision in Crawford v. Washington.263 The Crawford Court rejected Roberts, 
describing its reliability approach to the Confrontation Clause as “amorphous” and 
inconsistent with the Framers’ intent.264 According to Crawford, the Roberts 
approach resulted in courts “admit[ting] core testimonial statements that the 
Confrontation Clause plainly meant to exclude.”265 The Court explained that a person 
is a “witness” for Confrontation Clause purposes if he made a “testimonial” 
statement that is being used against the defendant.266 After Crawford, a witness’s 
testimonial statement is “inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the 
witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.267 Thus, post-Crawford the key question when the prosecution seeks to 
introduce an out-of-court statement is “does it qualify as testimonial?” Although the 
Crawford Court did not define the term “testimonial,” it explained that testimony is 
“typically a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of establishing 
or proving a fact.”268 Importantly, the Court did make clear that “[s]tatements taken 
by police officers in the course of interrogations” are testimonial.269 
In the nearly fifteen years since Crawford, the Supreme Court has decided 
a series of cases that have attempted to clarify what constitutes a testimonial 
statement.270 From these cases, a test has emerged that focuses on the “primary 
purpose” of the statement when it was made.271 A statement is testimonial if the 
primary purpose was “to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later 
criminal prosecution.”272 If the primary purpose was something else (i.e., to address 
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an ongoing emergency), then the statement is non-testimonial.273 For purposes of the 
current discussion, the two most relevant post-Crawford cases are Melendez-Diaz v. 
Massachusetts274 and Bullcoming v. New Mexico.275 Both dealt with the testimonial 
nature of laboratory reports that were prepared as part of a criminal investigation. 
The Court found Confrontation Clause violations in both cases. 
The defendant in Melendez-Diaz faced cocaine distribution charges after he 
was found in possession of nineteen baggies of the drug.276 As part of the 
investigation, the police submitted the nineteen baggies to a state laboratory for 
confirmation that they contained cocaine.277 After testing the drugs, analysts 
prepared three “certificates of analysis” reporting that the substance in the seized 
baggies was cocaine.278 Each certificate was sworn to before a notary public as 
required by state law.279 The case went to trial, and the prosecution sought to 
introduce the three certificates without calling the analysts who signed them.280 The 
defendant objected, arguing that he had a Sixth Amendment right to confront the 
analysts.281 The objection was overruled, the defendant was convicted, and he 
appealed all the way to the Supreme Court.282 The Melendez-Diaz Court reversed his 
conviction, finding that the defendant had a right to confront the analysts because the 
certificates were testimonial statements under Crawford.283 
In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained that the certificates were 
designed for the purpose of proving at trial that the substance was of a particular 
“composition, quality, and . . . net weight.”284 The analysts who prepared them were, 
therefore, “‘witnesses’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”285 The government 
had argued that the Confrontation Clause was not implicated because the certificates 
simply stated the results of “neutral, scientific testing” and were, therefore, less prone 
to manipulation than normal testimony.286 Swiftly rejecting that argument, the Court 
pointed out that, scientific or not, the defendant was entitled to cross examine the 
analysts who conducted the testing.287 
The Court observed that there were several areas of cross examination that 
the defendant may have wished to pursue with the analysts. Those included possible 
bias (given that many laboratories are operated by law enforcement agencies), 
incompetence, lack of training and experience, or poor judgment.288 According to 
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the Court, forensic testing “requires the exercise of judgment and presents a risk of 
error,”289 and “[c]onfrontation is one means of assuring accurate forensic 
analysis.”290 Underscoring the fact that post-Crawford the reliability of the statement 
is irrelevant to the Confrontation Clause question, the Melendenz-Diaz Court noted 
that the analysts who prepared the certificates would be subject to cross examination 
even if “all analysts always possessed the scientific acumen of Mme. Curie and the 
veracity of Mother Theresa.”291 
Two years after Melendez-Diaz, the Court issued its decision in 
Bullcoming.292 In Bullcoming, the defendant was arrested for DUI.293 A blood sample 
was sent to the state laboratory for determination of the defendant’s blood alcohol 
concentration.294 An analyst performed the test and recorded the result in a forensic 
laboratory report.295 The analyst who completed the report did not testify at trial; 
rather, the prosecution admitted the report through another analyst who was familiar 
with the testing process and had reviewed the report.296 The defendant argued that 
report was testimonial and that he had the right to cross examine the analyst who 
actually prepared the report, as opposed to a surrogate.297 The New Mexico Supreme 
Court agreed that the report was testimonial, but it held that the opportunity to cross 
examine the surrogate analyst satisfied the Confrontation Clause because (1) the 
certifying analyst was a “mere scrivener who simply transcribed” results generated 
by a machine; and (2) the surrogate analyst was able to testify regarding the testing 
process, the operation of the machine, and the results of the defendant’s test.298 
The Bullcoming Court disagreed and reversed the defendant’s conviction.299 
According to the Court, the lower courts incorrectly “permitted the testimonial 
statement of one witness [the certifying analyst], to enter into evidence through in-
court testimony of a second person [the surrogate analyst].”300 The Court explained 
that the certifying analyst was not a “mere scrivener”; rather, he received the blood 
sample, ensured it was intact, matched the sample number and the report number, 
and conducted the test using a particular protocol.301 All of those activities were 
things the defense could have asked about on cross examination.302 
Furthermore, Bullcoming made clear that even if the certifying analyst 
simply wrote down a machine generated number “the comparative reliability of an 
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analyst’s testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome 
the Sixth Amendment bar.”303 
The Court was also unpersuaded by the argument that the ability to cross 
examine a surrogate analyst satisfied the Confrontation Clause.304 Although the 
surrogate may have been familiar with the testing procedures, he could not testify as 
to how this particular test was conducted and whether the procedures were followed. 
Moreover, defense counsel could not cross examine the surrogate on issues relating 
to the certifying analyst’s potential “incompetence, evasiveness, or dishonesty.”305 
In support of its decision, the Bullcoming Court reiterated just how strict the 
Confrontation Clause is post-Crawford: 
[T]he text of the Sixth Amendment does not suggest any open-ended 
exceptions from the confrontation requirement to be developed by the courts . . . [it 
is not] the role of the courts to extrapolate from the words of the Confrontation 
Clause to the values behind it, and then enforce its guarantees only to the extent they 
serve (in the court’s view) those underlying values.306 
The next section will discuss how the courts have applied the Confrontation 
Clause to out-of-court statements made by non-testifying interpreters. 
B. Cases Applying the Confrontation Clause to Statements Made by Non-
Testifying Interpreters 
The issue of whether it violates the Confrontation Clause to admit out-of-
court statements made by a non-testifying interpreter has divided the federal circuit 
courts,307 as well as the state courts.308 The split has led to calls for Supreme Court 
intervention that have yet been unheeded.309 It is undoubtedly an issue that is ripe for 
review. 
Although there has been a flurry of litigation in this area recently, at least 
one court considered the question nearly a century and a half ago. The case was 
People v. Fat,310 and it was decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1880. 
There, the defendant was charged with committing perjury during a preliminary 
hearing.311 Because the defendant did not speak English, he testified through an 
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interpreter at the preliminary hearing.312 At his perjury trial, the prosecution 
introduced the transcript of the defendant’s preliminary hearing without calling the 
stenographer or the interpreter.313 The Fat court reversed the defendant’s conviction 
because the trial court violated the “the right and privilege of the accused to 
[confront] and cross-examine the witnesses in the case.”314 Additionally, the court 
stated that the “interpreter, or some other witness to the facts, should have been 
called, on the part of the prosecution . . . The defendant would then have had the 
privilege of cross-examination, which was denied him on the trial of this case.”315 
As the Supreme Court of the Territory of Hawaii stated when addressing a related 
issue in its 1911 decision in Hawaii v. Kawano: 
The right to subject an interpreter, on the witness stand, to cross-
examination on the foreign expressions and terms used by him as interpreter, or used 
by the witness for whom he has acted as interpreter, is a right well recognized by 
law, and is founded upon the general rules and principles which govern the cross-
examination of other witnesses.316 
Neither Fat nor Kawano cited the Sixth Amendment (which had not yet 
been incorporated to the states),317 but both decisions demonstrate that—while the 
approaches may have changed over the years—the question of whether the defendant 
has a right to cross examine the interpreter is not new. 
During the Roberts era of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, the 
prevailing view was that a defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to cross 
examine an interpreter about what the interpreter said the defendant said outside of 
court. As with the hearsay issue discussed at length above, the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Nazemian is one of the most cited cases issues on this 
issue. In Nazemian, the court rejected the defendant’s Confrontation Clause 
challenge on the basis that the interpreter and the defendant were “identical for 
testimonial purposes.”318 Thus, there was no Confrontation Clause problem in the 
eyes of Nazemian because a defendant has no right to cross examine himself. The 
Ninth Circuit’s Confrontation Clause analysis was grounded in the Ohio v. Roberts 
determination that the admission of “reliable” out- of-court statements did not 
implicate the Confrontation Clause.319 
Despite the seismic shift in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that was 
Crawford, the Ninth Circuit has continually reaffirmed Nazemian. The most 
extensive discussion of the issue can be found in United States v. Orm Hieng, which 
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was decided by the Ninth Circuit in 2012.320 In that case, the defendant argued that 
the trial court violated the Confrontation Clause by permitting a law enforcement 
officer to testify as to what a non-testifying interpreter said the defendant said during 
an interview.321 The court recognized that there was “some tension between the 
Nazemian analysis and the Supreme Court’s recent approach to the Confrontation 
Clause.”322 But, it found that Nazemian was not “clearly irreconcilable” with 
Crawford and its progeny because none of the Supreme Court’s cases addressed a 
scenario where the statement in question “may be fairly attributed directly” to the 
defendant who “cannot complain that he was denied the opportunity to confront 
himself.”323 
Judge Marsha Berzon authored a separate concurrence that questioned 
whether Nazemian remained good law. She stated that “Nazemian rests, at bottom, 
on a pre-Crawford understanding of the unity between hearsay concepts and the 
Confrontation Clause analysis[, and] its ultimate conclusion . . . seems in great 
tension with” Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.324 Because a single panel of the court 
could not overrule Nazemian, Judge Berzon urged her colleagues to consider en banc 
review in a later case.325 That has yet to happen. Instead, the Ninth Circuit has 
continued to rely on Nazemian to reject Confrontation Clause challenges to out-of-
court statements made by a non-testifying interpreter.326 The Fifth Circuit has also 
relied on Nazemian, as well as Orm Hieng’s conclusion that Nazemian remains good 
law.327 
The Eleventh Circuit, however, has taken a different path. In United States 
v. Charles, a law enforcement officer questioned the Creole-speaking defendant 
using an interpreter who was under contract with the Department of Homeland 
Security.328 When the case proceeded to trial, the law enforcement officer “told the 
jury what the interpreter told him [the defendant] had said.”329 The interpreter did 
not testify, and the defendant was convicted.330 On appeal, the defendant argued that 
her Confrontation Clause rights were violated.331 The Eleventh Circuit agreed, 
finding that the defendant had a “Sixth Amendment right to confront the interpreter, 
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who is the declarant of the out-of-court testimonial statements that the government 
sought to admit through the testimony of the [law enforcement] officer.”332 
Applying Crawford, the court determined that the interpreter’s statements 
to the officer regarding what the defendant said were testimonial because they were 
made in the context of a police interrogation.333 The court further explained that there 
were “two sets of testimonial statements that were made out-of-court by two different 
declarants”—the defendant was the declarant of the foreign language statements, and 
the interpreter was the declarant of the English statements.334 After discussing how 
language interpretation works, the Charles court roundly rejected the legal fiction 
that the defendant and the interpreter were one and the same.335 And, the court made 
clear that the reliability of the statement is irrelevant for Confrontation Clause 
purposes.336 The court also pointed to Melendez-Diaz and opined that if the “results 
of ‘neutral, scientific testing’ do not exempt the witness who performed the test from 
cross-examination, certainly the Confrontation Clause requires an interpreter of the 
concepts and nuances of language to be available for cross-examination at trial.”337 
Of the relatively few state courts to address the Confrontation Clause issue 
post-Crawford, most have found no violation on the basis that the interpreter was the 
functional equivalent of the defendant who has no right to cross examine himself.338 
Yet in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
reached the opposite conclusion in Taylor v. State.339 The defendant in Taylor was 
deaf, and he was interrogated by the police with the assistance of a sign language 
interpreter.340 At trial, the prosecution introduced an audio recording of the 
interpreter’s English translations of what the defendant said in sign language.341 The 
audio recording was introduced during the officer’s testimony, and the interpreter 
did not testify even though the accuracy of the interpreter’s translations was a 
disputed issue at trial.342 The trial court rejected the defendant’s Confrontation 
Clause objection, and he was convicted.343 
After surveying the applicable law, the Taylor court reversed the conviction 
because “the trial court committed reversible error when it admitted the interpreter’s 
extrajudicial account of [the defendant’s] statements after [the defendant] had 
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asserted his rights under the Confrontation Clause.”344 The court determined that the 
interpreter’s statements as to what the defendant said were testimonial under 
Crawford.345 Moreover, the Taylor court explained that the government’s argument 
that the interpreter was “‘merely a relay’ is no more persuasive than the faulty 
assertion of the Supreme Court of New Mexico [in Bullcoming] that a forensic lab 
technician served as a ‘mere scrivener,’ who did nothing more than record the results 
of a machine-generated test.”346 Finally, the court stressed that cross examination of 
the interpreter could have addressed important issues such as the interpreter’s 
fluency, experience, methods, and trustworthiness.347 Even if the interpreter was 
perfectly competent and honest, “questioning of the interpreter might illuminate the 
precise meaning of a particularly important statement.”348 
The Eleventh Circuit in Charles and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals 
in Taylor correctly concluded that it violates the Confrontation Clause to admit what 
an interpreter said the defendant said during a police interview, unless the interpreter 
testifies or is unavailable and was previously subject to cross examination. There can 
be no genuine debate that statements made by an interpreter during a police interview 
are “testimonial” under Crawford.349 After all, the entire purpose of a police 
interview is to obtain information for possible use at a later criminal trial.350 No court 
has held otherwise. Rather, courts like the Ninth Circuit in Nazemian and its progeny 
have attempted to sidestep the entire Confrontation Clause issue by pretending that 
the defendant and the police officer conversed directly in English without any 
interpreter present. If the defendant is the “speaker . . . the Sixth Amendment simply 
has no application because a defendant cannot complain that he was denied the 
opportunity to confront himself.”351 
As Judge Berzon recognized in her Orm Hieng concurrence, this approach 
reflects a view of the Confrontation Clause that was rejected by Crawford. The idea 
that a defendant who seeks to cross examine the interpreter (who oftentimes works 
for the investigating agency) is effectively seeking to cross examine himself flies in 
the face of reality and contradicts the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. As the Charles and Taylor courts correctly recognized, the interpreter 
and the defendant “are not one and the same.”352 Language interpretation is a 
complex process that requires skill, judgment, and discretion.353 Treating the 
defendant and the interpreter as though they are the same person “disregards the 
difficult realities of real-time language interpretation,” and prevents the defendant 
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from exercising his right “to confront an interpreter about bias, proficiency, and 
errors or inaccuracies in the translation.”354 
The Supreme Court made clear in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that the 
Confrontation Clause provides a defendant with the right to cross examine those who 
make testimonial statements, regardless of how reliable the statements may appear 
to be on their face. As the Court explained, “[d]ispensing with confrontation because 
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a 
defendant is obviously guilty.”355 A comparison of the current issue to Melendez-
Diaz and Bullcoming leads to the conclusion that a defendant has a right to cross 
examine the interpreter. 
In both cases, the Court explained that there were areas ripe for cross-
examination of the certifying analyst. Those included, bias, training and experience, 
proficiency, and methodology.356 Every concern that the Melendez-Diaz Court stated 
with respect to the accuracy of the lab report is present (indeed, even more present) 
with statements made by an interpreter. Just as there have been well documented 
errors in laboratory testing, there have been well documented errors in language 
interpretation. If the Confrontation Clause is designed to “weed out not only the 
fraudulent analyst, but the incompetent one as well,” there is no reason to believe it 
was not designed to also “weed out” the fraudulent and incompetent interpreters. If 
the prosecution wishes to introduce testimony about what an interpreter said the 
defendant said during a police interview, then the Confrontation Clause requires the 
prosecution to call the interpreter at trial or establish that the interpreter is 
“unavailable and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.”357 
III. GUIDANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES AND 
PROSECUTORS GOING FORWARD 
Law enforcement agencies and prosecutors are likely to respond to this 
Article by arguing that calling the interpreter to testify is impractical and will make 
it more difficult to successfully prosecute guilty offenders. Prosecutors will point out 
that in many cases, the interpreter—even if available—will be unable to testify as to 
what he or she told the officer that the defendant said during a police interview. This 
is so because the interpreter may not remember the details of the interview. Unlike 
the investigating officer, an interpreter is not typically invested in the case, takes no 
notes, writes no reports, and may conduct multiple interpretations per day. 
There is a relatively straightforward solution to this problem. Police officers 
should record the interview. In our modern world, this is easy to accomplish—the 
officer simply needs a smartphone or tablet, almost all of which have video and audio 
recording capabilities. When the case goes to trial, a prosecutor (who was unable or 
unwilling to call the interpreter) would have an option for ensuring that the jury hears 
what the defendant said during the interview without violating the hearsay rules or 
the Confrontation Clause. 
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All the prosecutor would have to do is place the interviewing officer on the 
stand, authenticate the recording, and then play the relevant parts of the defendant’s 
uninterpreted statement as spoken in the defendant’s foreign language. The 
courtroom interpreter could then translate the defendant’s statements into English for 
the jury, the same as the courtroom interpreter would if the defendant or any other 
non-English speaker testified at trial. Proceeding in this fashion eliminates the 
hearsay and Confrontation Clause issues discussed above because the defendant’s 
statements on the recording would be party opponent statements (albeit foreign 
language ones) under Rule 801(d)(2)(A). And, the courtroom interpreter’s 
translation would not pose a hearsay problem because it would occur inside the 
courtroom. Any concerns about the interpreter’s in-court translation of the 
defendant’s statement could be raised by defense counsel and addressed by the court 
in the same manner that it addresses all issues involving a courtroom interpreter’s 
performance.358 
Indeed, two state courts have recognized that recording the defendant’s 
interview could obviate, or at least minimize, the current problem. In State v. Mitjans, 
the Supreme Court of Minnesota explained that “prudent police investigators who 
wish to reduce substantially the risk of subsequent suppression of statements” taken 
from non-English speaking suspects should consider several options, including 
“tape-record[ing] the interrogation of the defendant.”359 And, in Commonwealth v. 
AdonSoto, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts went so far as to announce 
that “[g]oing forward, and where practicable, we expect that all interviews and 
interrogations using interpreter services will be recorded.”360 
Any relatively minor cost or inconvenience caused by recording police 
interviews of non-English speaking suspects will be significantly outweighed by the 
benefits of reduced litigation, improved accuracy, and increased protection of the 
defendant’s rights. There may be situations where recording the interview is 
impossible. In those situations, the prosecution should call the interpreter to testify 
if it seeks to introduce what the interpreter said the defendant said. If the interpreter 
is unavailable (and was not previously subject to cross examination), or the 
interpreter is available but unable to recall what the defendant said, then the 
prosecution will be unable to introduce the statements. That result may be 
undesirable in a particular case, but it is the result dictated by the Rules of Evidence 
and the Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The question of whether the hearsay rules and/or the Confrontation Clause 
prevent a witness from testifying as to what an interpreter said the defendant said in 
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a police interview is one the courts have dealt with for many years. As it relates to 
the hearsay issue, the courts have provided different answers to that question at 
different points in our history—with the early courts favoring exclusion and the 
modern courts favoring admission. To justify the admission of this category of 
evidence, the courts have created the language conduit and agency theories. 
Although in many circumstances the law evolves in a positive way over time, this is 
not one of them. The early courts were correct in their determination that the hearsay 
rules prohibit evidence about what a non-testifying interpreter said the defendant said 
outside of court. The language conduit and agency theories applied by the modern 
courts are fatally flawed. 
Similarly flawed is the approach a majority of the courts have taken to 
answering the Confrontation Clause question. Although currently minority 
viewpoints, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Charles and the 
Maryland Court of Special Appeal’s decision in Taylor v. State represent appropriate 
applications of the Supreme Court’s post-Crawford Confrontation Clause 
jurisprudence. If the prosecution wishes to introduce evidence about what a non-
English speaking defendant said during a police interrogation, then it must call the 
interpreter or introduce a recording of the defendant’s statements during the 
interview. 
 
 
 
